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ABSTRACT 
 
Long-term disaster recovery is a crucial phase in terms of sustainable development as 
well as disaster resilience. Increasing roles of various players make it hard to manage 
implementation process. Even though there is a general consensus on idealistic aim, it is not 
easy to achieve long-term recovery goals effectively. In reality, there are many unexpected 
situations after disaster impacts. In such urgent situation to take action for recovery, it is 
almost impossible to make perfectly rational decision. Therefore, identifying the mechanism 
of actual decision-making in disaster recovery can contribute to achieve the recovery 
objectives through sustainable process. 
Previous researches on long-term recovery have mainly focused on identifying desirable 
decisions and efficient strategies. However, consideration on the cause of irrational decision 
under disaster conditions was limited. Although there were recent researches on recovery 
players’ motives and interactive decision-making respectively, the analysis framework 
unifying both characteristics in decisions of long-term recovery was not suggested. 
This research aims to identify the cause of divergence of recovery process from the 
desirable direction in terms of decisions. For that purpose, the analysis on decisions in long-
term recovery that focuses on multifaceted motives varying with the context and interactive 
decision-making between associated players is applied.  
As a case of long-term recovery, the permanent housing reconstruction by International 
NGOs in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is analyzed. This case clearly 
showed the gap between lessons learned in normative approach and actual decision-making 
in the field, and the necessity of the analysis framework on decisions in terms of interactive 
decision-making among players with multifaceted motives. 
Analysis procedure consists of four steps: (1) Identification of key decisions and 
associated players, (2) Motive analysis based on the context of decision, (3) Interactive 
decision analysis, and (4) Identification of key conditions to improve decisions. 
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In Sri Lanka case, two key decisions were identified. One is the Government of Sri 
Lanka's failure of relocation policy using uniform distance line from the coastline at initial 
planning. Another is International NGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal of 
reconstruction projects during implementation. 
The analysis using classic game theory shows the difficulty of sustainable long-term 
disaster recovery process. Even when players had the long-term goal, or shared the long-term 
goal, such long-term goals may not be implemented due to the decisions of interactive 
decisions-making process. Although players make a rational choice depending on their own 
motives and contexts, the decision as result of interactive decision-making can hamper the 
achievement of recovery objective.  
For achieving long-term recovery goals, it is important that recovery policy and 
institutions are corresponding to each player’s motive at specific time. Motive compatible 
policy and institutions can achieve the long-term recovery goals as subgame perfect 
equilibrium by making the condition for all players to match their own motives at each phase. 
Suggested practical solutions are reviewed in terms of motive-compatibility and applicability 
to actual complex conditions of Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami.   
Because of various uncertainties immediately after the disaster, the influence of 
uncertainties on irrational decision-making of each player should be considered. Hypergame 
analysis is applied to the government’s hasty decision of relocation. As the result of 
hypergame analysis, the outcome of interactive decision itself is the same with previous 
analysis. However, misunderstanding, which represented as differently perceived 
counterpart’s preference order, became one of causes that prevented desirable decision in 
terms of long-term recovery objectives.  
In this research, it indicates that adjustment of recovery policy and institutions 
considering players’ motive is important to achieve the long-term recovery goals. To develop 
such findings to concrete recovery policy, accumulation of research results on other cases in 
different context is needed as further research.  
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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
Long-term disaster recovery such as infrastructure and housing reconstruction, especially 
in developing countries, is a crucial phase in terms of sustainable development as well as 
disaster resilience. Increasing roles of various players including International Non-
Governmental Organization (INGO) and the private sector make it hard to manage 
implementation process. Even though there is a general consensus on idealistic aim, it is not 
easy to achieve long-term recovery goals effectively. It is because each recovery player has 
multifaceted motives, which vary with the context, and makes interactive decisions with other 
players for cooperation. In reality, there are many unexpected situations after disaster impacts. 
In such urgent situation to take action for recovery, it is almost impossible to make perfectly 
rational decision. Therefore, identifying the mechanism of actual decision-making in disaster 
recovery can contribute to achieve the recovery objectives through sustainable process.  
Previous researches on long-term recovery have mainly focused on identifying desirable 
decisions and efficient strategies. However, consideration on the cause of irrational decision 
under disaster conditions was limited. Consequently, accumulated lessons learned by 
recovery experiences have not been linked to the efficient achievement of recovery goals, and 
similar mistakes in long-term recovery have been repeated. Although there were recent 
researches on recovery players’ motives and interactive decision-making respectively, the 
analysis framework unifying both characteristics in decisions of long-term recovery was not 
suggested.  
This research aims to identify the cause of divergence of recovery process from the 
desirable direction in terms of decisions. For that purpose, the analysis on decisions in long-
term recovery that focuses on multifaceted motives varying with the context and interactive 
decision-making between associated players is applied. It shows the limitation of existing 
normative approach focusing on single decision-maker’s will. It also discusses the decisive 
conditions for changing key decisions, which seriously hindered achievement recovery goals, 
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as well. In this research, it is ultimately aimed to contribute to the improvement of long-term 
recovery process.  
As a case of long-term recovery, the permanent housing reconstruction by INGOs in Sri 
Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is analyzed. With abundant financial support and 
participation of INGOs as implementers, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) had planned 
to relocate 30,602 houses, one third of total 98,525 houses for reconstruction, by INGOs-
driven reconstruction. However, as a result of long process, only 16,578 houses are 
completed by INGOs-driven program. Besides, it resulted slow progress and low occupation 
rate of new houses, which reached to 37% in Hambantota. Although many researches on Sri 
Lanka case had found several factors that caused limited outcomes, these factors were 
enumerated without unifying framework of actual decision. Moreover, some suggested 
solutions, such as consideration of future vulnerability, were already included the ‘Guiding 
Principles’, which were shared to all involved players before the start of reconstruction. This 
case clearly showed the gap between lessons learned in normative approach and actual 
decision-making in the field, and the necessity of the analysis framework on decisions in 
terms of interactive decision-making among players with multifaceted motives.  
This research analyzes the decisions in long-term recovery focusing on multifaceted 
motives varying with the context and interactive decision-making between associated players 
in Sri Lanka. Analysis procedure consists of four steps: (1) Identification of key decisions 
and associated players, (2) Motive analysis based on the context of decision, (3) Interactive 
decision analysis, and (4) Identification of key conditions to improve decisions. As the 
analysis method for interactive decision-making between recovery players, the game 
theoretic approaches are applied. Two different methods are suggested according to the focal 
points: (a) Classic game theory-based analysis is applied to sequential decisions in terms of 
process aspect in long-term recovery, and (b) Hypergame-based analysis is applied to the 
decision at the early stage of cooperation in regard to uncertainty and misunderstanding 
during the disaster situation.   
 In Sri Lanka case, two key decisions were identified. One is GoSL's failure of relocation 
policy using uniform distance line from the coastline at initial planning. Another is INGOs’ 
temporary or permanent withdrawal of reconstruction projects during implementation. As key 
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players, GoSL and INGOs are considered. Based on the literature review, each player’s 
payoff table regarding possible decisions is evaluated. 
In terms of decision of coastal buffer zone, no reconstruction zone for the safety from 
tsunami, hasty introduction of uniform distance relocation policy by GoSL was the result of 
complex conditions and motives including GoSL’s political conflict, lack of relocation 
experience, and INGO’s competition for recovery participation. For GoSL's failure of 
relocation policy, it was shown that if the INGOs had declared their appropriate strategy, 
which served as the thread, GoSL’s right choice could be the relocation policy using 
subdivided criteria. However, it did not happen because of competition among INGOs. 
Therefore, permanent coordination system among INGOs in housing field can be a practical 
solution. 
INGOs’ projects withdrawal was made based on motives and conditions including 
accumulated limitation of uniform relocation plan, political regime change, and emergence of 
new vulnerable people. For INGO’s withdrawal, the situation was analyzed by the game 
theoretic framework and it was shown that even though INGOs and GoSL might have 
recognized that there was an Pareto optimal solution, they had to take another solution, Nash-
equilibrium of the game, without mutual trust. It indicates that GoSL could have prevented 
INGOs’ withdrawal during the recovery, as a motive-compatible solution, by shared 
responsibility for housing reconstruction, which will increase INGO’s expected payoff in 
long-term participation. 
The analysis using classic game theory shows the difficulty of sustainable long-term 
disaster recovery process.  Even when players had the long-term goal, or shared the long-term 
goal, such long-term goals may not be implemented due to the decisions of interactive 
decisions-making process. Although players make a rational choice depending on their own 
motives and contexts, the decision as result of interactive decision-making can hamper the 
achievement of recovery objective.  
For achieving long-term recovery goals, it is important that recovery policy and 
institutions are corresponding to each player’s motive at specific time. Motive compatible 
policy and institutions can achieve the long-term recovery goals as subgame perfect 
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equilibrium by making the condition for all players to match their own motives at each phase. 
Suggested practical solutions are reviewed in terms of motive-compatibility and applicability 
to actual complex conditions of Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami.  
The analysis also indicates the importance of the initial stage of the process since the 
failure in the initial phase had a lasting effect on players’ motives as path dependency. For 
instance, government’s exclusion of INGOs in initial planning demotivated INGOs’ 
continuous participation in long-term recovery, leading to the decline in outcomes of housing 
reconstruction.  
Because of various uncertainties immediately after the disaster, the influence of 
uncertainties on irrational decision-making of each player should be considered. Hypergame 
analysis is applied to GoSL’s hasty decision of relocation. Strategies of players will be 
defined according to each player’s subjective perspective. Subjective perspective on 
counterpart’s preference order is identified according to shared information between players 
and the characteristics of each recovery player. Individual games based on interpretation of 
others are analyzed in the context of each player. Finally, the influence of misunderstanding 
on recovery process and practical solution are discussed. 
As the result of hypergame analysis, the outcome of interactive decision itself is the same 
with previous analysis. At the same time, misunderstanding, which represented as differently 
perceived counterpart’s preference order, became one of causes that prevented desirable 
decision in terms of long-term recovery objectives. As a practical solution to reduce 
misunderstanding, the complemented list of information for NGO registration system is 
suggested. 
The problems discussed in this research have a game theoretic structure. It indicates the 
importance of coordination and information sharing among associated organizations would 
be helpful to overcome those problems.  It is not an easy task, but would deserve the efforts.   
In this research, it indicates that adjustment of recovery policy and institutions considering 
players’ motive is important to achieve the long-term recovery goals. To develop such 
findings to concrete recovery policy, accumulation of research results on other cases in 
different context is needed as further research.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The frequency and severity of natural disasters are on an increasing trend since 1980 
(Ghesquiere & Reid, 2012). According to the statistics on worldwide disasters between 
1980 and 2012, 8 of the 10 deadliest disasters and 7 of the 10 costliest disasters in terms 
of overall losses are occurred during the last ten-year period (Munich RE, 2013). There 
is a growing need for disaster management measures in preparation for unexpected large-
scale natural disaster. The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011, the 
costliest disaster, showed that no country, no matter how well prepared, can perfectly 
protect itself from large-scale disasters with low probability of occurrence (Ghesquiere & 
Reid, 2012).  
Disaster damage consists of initial loss by impact and recovery time (Miles & Chang, 
2006). Ideally, initial loss should be prevented by physical mitigation measures. In spite 
of the same scale of initial damage, however, the damage can be also reduced by quick 
and effective recovery process. Therefore, understanding of post-disaster recovery 
process becomes important for minimizing inevitable disaster impact on society. The 
growing interest in disaster resilience reflects the importance of post-disaster recovery 
process.  
Long-term recovery such as infrastructure and housing reconstruction, especially in 
developing countries, is a crucial phase in terms of sustainable development as well as 
disaster resilience because it becomes the prerequisite for development. However, 
damage by large-scale natural disasters generally exceeds ordinary capacity of local 
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government and people in developing countries. For quick recovery, the assistance of 
foreign aid agencies is essential. In marginalized area, exceptional assistance from 
outside can be a rare opportunity for local development as well as the momentum of 
recovery.  
Long-term recovery aid for permanent housing and infrastructure has been increased 
in importance. According to the study by the World Bank, overall funds available had 
not increased for 20 years since 1980, but the share of loans supporting housing 
reconstruction had grown (Gilbert, 2001 as cited in Lyon, 2009). In the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake recovery, for instance, construction partnership was the second largest part of 
partnership between International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) and local 
agency after partnership for food distribution (Coles & Zhuang, 2012). Various actors 
including INGOs and the private sector have taken on increasing influential roles in 
disaster recovery (Pelling & Dill, 2010). However, when aid agencies take part in long-
term recovery programs as an implementer, recovery cooperation becomes more 
complicated than short-term recovery in which aid agency works as a supporter. By 
increasing roles of various actors in several phases, it is not easy to manage long-term 
recovery process and achieve the expected goals.  
In spite of increasing importance, disaster recovery represents the least understood 
aspect of emergency management for both researchers and practitioners (Smith & 
Wenger, 2006). Most researches and reports on long-term recovery have addressed 
several aspects of sustainable recovery mainly as normative solutions or effective 
strategies (World Bank, 2005; IFRC, 2006; Jha et al., 2010; UN-Habitat, 2011). For 
instance, Peru and Turkey experienced huge earthquake respectively in 1970. Both 
governments initiated large reconstruction including relocation with unprecedented 
assistance from external humanitarian agencies (Sadiqi et al., 2012). However, relocation 
without community participation resulted in unoccupied houses and remained 
vulnerability to risks even after 40 years (Schilderman, 2010). Such experiences left 
lessons for importance of community participation in long-term recovery. After 30 years, 
however, the same problems by exclusion of community had been repeating in Turkey 
after 2000 Earthquake, India after 2001 Earthquake, and Indonesia after 2004 tsunami 
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(Sadiqi et al., 2012). Even for other normative lessons on sustainable recovery process, 
such as considering local needs and minimizing forced relocation, the repeating failures 
in implementation are much the same with case of community participation (Leon et al., 
2009; Jha et al., 2010).  
The cause of repeating same problems is that lessons learned are fragmentary 
considered in normative approach, without consideration of complicated characteristics 
in actual decision-making process. According to Sadiqi et al.’s research (2012) on 
problems in housing reconstruction, though communities participate in recovery 
planning and implementation, another unexpected problem was occurred. After the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, there were some cases of community participation in housing 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka and Maldives. In Sri Lanka, in some projects, 2nd floor 
houses were constructed reflecting opinions of disaster-affected people, who concerned 
about another tsunami (Shaw & Ahmed, 2010). However, it was revealed that 2nd floor 
was uninhabitable space because of inappropriate design without consideration of local 
condition. In another case of Maldives, house-owners were participated in 250 houses 
reconstruction. However, unreasonable interfere by house-owner who obsessed by 
quality of their own house made the government of Maldives excluded community 
participation (Lawther, 2009). It shows that only consideration of community 
participation had clear limitation when recovery player’s motive in recovery is not 
considered.  
There are similar instances related to players’ complex motives. The reason why 
forced relocation is often included in recovery planning is that the government has 
motive to isolate affected people from risk prone areas (Dikmen, 2005, as cited in Sadiqi 
et al., 2012). In the same manner, in the recovery aids programs, lack of consideration 
for local needs and cultures are closely related to aid implementers’ interest mainly in 
their project costs and speed (Sadiqi et al., 2012). In spite of accumulated knowledge on 
principles for sustainable disaster recovery in normative approach, previous researches 
have not been linked to a unifying theory that helps to clarify how sustainable recovery 
can be achieved, and practitioners have failed to establish an integrated policy 
framework to improve recovery outcomes (Smith & Wenger, 2006). Without identifying 
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mechanism for recovery process to last long, complicated influential factors had been 
addressed as a list. Although it is true that numerous aspects of the society influence 
long-term recovery process, a mere listing of influential factors could not be led to 
improve outcomes in practice. 
Another cause of limited implementation of lessons learned from recovery 
experience is that the role of single decision-maker was emphasized. Most suggestions 
for better disaster recovery were made focusing on knowledge and the will of single 
decision-maker, usually policy-maker of the government. In the long-term recovery 
process, however, recovery outcomes are determined by accumulated results of several 
phases including planning, design and construction in which various players’ decisions 
are involved (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). Moreover, in chaotic situation after disaster, 
many recovery players often made somewhat irrational decisions in terms of long-term 
objective. Therefore, decision-making in disaster recovery should be understood in the 
actual context of interdependent relation of various actors during long-term recovery.  
Based on the understanding of decision-making, it will be possible to identify the 
key factors for sustainable process. To achieve this, two characteristics of actual 
decision-making in long-term recovery process should be considered as shown in Figure 
1.1. One characteristic is multifaceted motives for recovery in a recovery player. Another 
characteristic is interdependence of various players in decision-making during 
cooperative process. Multifaceted motives and interactive relation are continuously 
changed according to changing context and conditions through long-term process of 
recovery. Researches on these characteristics of decision-making in disaster recovery 
process are partially conducted. 
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Figure 1.1 Characteristics of decision making in long-term recovery 
 
Various recovery players including the government, disaster-affected people and 
INGOs share the common objective for long-term recovery cooperation. At the same 
time, however, they have respective objective and motive as well. Regarding perception 
of risks, for example, the government and NGO focus on hazards related risk, while 
people tend to think basic needs related risk as more important risk (Bosher, 2011). 
There is also difference in the viewpoint on root causes of disasters, recovery objective, 
and motives even between the government and NGO (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009). Both 
aim to support disaster-affected people basically through disaster recovery. While the 
government agencies keep their taxpayers’ response in mind when the government 
makes a decision, NGOs have to meet the fund raising requirements for maintaining their 
works (Ebrahim, 2003; Werker, 2010). Various standpoints and motives according to 
recovery players can be complementary to some extent, but it can hamper the recovery 
process by conflicts among players (Jha et al., 2010). In the housing reconstruction, for 
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instance, allocation of houses based on identified needs is generally consented. Unlike 
the agreed objectives, the government sometimes selects ineligible beneficiaries without 
time-consuming process of strict screening under great pressure to decide as soon as 
possible (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). On the other hand, some aid agencies abandon their 
housing projects before completion because donors divert attention to the new flashpoint 
(Silva, 2009; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005). Such different motives existing in 
cooperation process can be a challenge to achieve the agreed goals in long-term recovery 
(Pyles & Hilhorst, 2012; Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009).  
Each player’s decision is dependent on not only its own multifaceted motives but 
also decision of other players (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009). According to the 
research of Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) on housing reconstruction after the 
Hurricane Katrina, rebuilding strategy of disaster-affected people was dependent on their 
expectation of the government’s capacity and intention to help victims.  If people expect 
that the government is incapable of helping and has no intention of doing so, people 
select the strategy to rebuild or relocate for themselves. On the other hand, when people 
hold the optimistic expectation such as ‘the government wants to help and is capable of 
doing so’ people decide to wait as tentative strategy (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009). In 
this case, the government’s recovery strategy also can be dependent on people’s 
collective reaction. Such interdependent decision-making can be found at cooperative 
relation between the government and INGOs for recovery as well. Therefore, recovery 
process can be understood as the result of interaction among players who choose the best 
strategy to achieve their objectives. 
Reflecting these two characteristics of actual decision-making in long-term recovery 
process, researches on recovery decisions based on recovery actors’ motives and 
interaction have been conducted using game theoretic approach. However, it is still in the 
beginning stages. In terms of short-term recovery, Coles and Zhuang (2010) analyzed 
interactions between international and local players for relief resource utilization using 
game theory. The authors discussed cooperative strategies using perspective from game 
theory in the problem of cooperative interactions between international and local players. 
After the case analysis of Hurricane Mitch, Indian Ocean Tsunami, and Haitian 
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Earthquake, the authors suggested the external actors to change their utility function, the 
objectives in recovery, to integrate a success of meeting local conditions. Regarding 
long-term recovery, Keraminiyage (2011) evaluated the applicability of game theory 
concepts to housing reconstruction as three players game by actors with different 
objective. The author focused on two possible strategies, externally managed 
reconstruction and community-driven reconstruction, and differently defined payoffs 
according to each player. However, these two researches focused on distinguishing 
different objectives according to types of actors. The concrete analysis methodology to 
identify the cause of decision, which is irrational choice in terms of long-term objective 
and hampers sustainability of recovery process, was not suggested. 
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1.2 Objective 
 
This research aims to identify the cause of divergence of recovery process from the 
desirable direction in terms of unreasonable decisions. For that purpose, the analysis on 
decisions in long-term recovery that focuses on multifaceted motives varying with the 
context and interactive decision-making between associated players will be applied. It 
will be shown the limitation of existing normative approach focusing on single decision-
maker’s will. It also discusses the decisive conditions for change key decisions, which 
seriously hindered achievement recovery goals, as well. In this research, it is ultimately 
aimed to contribute to the improvement of long-term recovery process.  
Previous researches on disaster recovery have presented directions of decision to 
improve recovery process. For example, importance of understanding the risk-benefit 
balance in post-disaster reconstruction is well known (Keraminiyage, 2011). Ingram et al. 
(2006) emphasized maintaining distinct objectives between short-term and long-term 
recovery goals. However, such contradictory elements reflect multifaceted objectives and 
motives of a player in disaster recovery. Several motives in one player do not always 
coincide. When conflict of motives occurs, the priority of motives at that moment 
became the criteria of decision. Therefore, to improve decisions for sustainable recovery, 
it is necessary to understand decision-maker’s main motives and its priority. At the same 
time, the decision of a player should be considered as the outcome of whole 
interdependent decision-making process with other related players because of interactive 
relation of other players in cooperative system (Shin, 2002). Based on these two aspects, 
the analysis framework for interactive decision-making process by players with 
multifaceted motives will be presented using game theoretic approaches. 
By application of this analysis framework to long-term disaster recovery case, the 
cause of divergence of long-term recovery process from the expected and desirable 
direction will be identified. The limit of normative approach focusing on single decision-
maker’s role will be analyzed as well. By understanding of interactive decision-making 
process by players with multifaceted motives at that moment, practical suggestion for 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
9!
improving actual decision can be made in terms of motive compatibility. Further, this 
approach will be helpful to identify key influential factors for sustainable recovery 
process from the list of numerous complicated factors. 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 1 has given a general introduction of long-term disaster recovery issues. By 
the literature review, limitations of previous researches in terms of implementation and 
characteristics of actual decision-making were addressed. For practical suggestion for 
sustainable recovery implementation, the need of analysis in consideration of interactive 
decision-making process by players with multifaceted motives was shown as the 
objective of this research.  
Chapter 2 will introduce the long-term housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka after the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In the actual recovery process, the gap between lessons 
learned in normative approach and decision-making in the field will be discussed. It will 
show the necessity for analysis of decisions in terms of interactive decision-making 
among players with multifaceted motives.  
Proposed analysis procedure consists of four steps: (1) identification of key decision 
and associated players, (2) motive analysis based on the context of decision, (3) 
interactive decision analysis, and (4) identification of key condition to improve decision. 
As the analysis method for interactive decision-making between recovery players, the 
game theoretic approaches are applied. In chapter 3 and 4, two different methods are 
suggested according to the focal points.  
Chapter 3 explains about the analysis procedure using classic game theoretic 
approach, which can be applied to sequential decisions in terms of process aspect in 
long-term recovery. In Sri Lanka case, two key decisions are identified. One is the 
government of Sri Lanka's failure of relocation policy at initial planning. Another is 
INGOs' temporary or permanent withdrawal during reconstruction implementation. 
These decisions will be analyzed in detail, and the conditions to improve decisions will 
be discussed based on actual circumstance of Sri Lanka after the tsunami.  
Chapter 4 shows hypergame-based analysis that is applied to the decision at the early 
stage of cooperation in terms to uncertainty and misunderstanding during the disaster 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
11!
situation. Subjective perspective on counterpart’s preference order is identified according 
to shared information between players and the characteristics of each recovery player. 
Individual game based on interpretation of others will be analyzed in the context of each 
player. Finally, by mapping of both individual games, the influence of misunderstanding 
on recovery process will be discussed.  
Chapter 5 will present the conclusion, limitation of the current work and future work 
to continue this research.    
The outline of thesis is shown in Figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Outline of Thesis  
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Chapter 2 
CASE: HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION 
 IN SRI LANKA  
AFTER THE 2004 TSUNAMI 
 
As a case to study, the permanent housing reconstruction by INGOs in Sri Lanka 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is discussed. 
 
2.1 Introduction of Long-term Recovery of Housing 
 
At 6:58 a.m. on December 26, 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter 
scale occurred off the Sumatran coast, triggering a tsunami of unprecedented proportions 
that killed almost a quarter of a million people in India, Indonesia, Thailand and Sri 
Lanka (UN-Habitat, 2011). The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the significant event in 
terms of recovery aids as well as disaster magnitude. Although the scale of the disaster in 
terms of casualties and economic loss has been exceeded several times in the past, the 
response to the tsunami was unprecedented (Belgian Red Cross–French Speaking 
Community, 2009). Instant disaster reporting by global media led to the quick 
mobilization of an international humanitarian response including the pledge of 
approximately 13.5 billion USD, an equivalent of annual global aid budget (Silva, 2009; 
Khasalamwa, 2009). The total funding was equivalent to more than 7,100 USD for every 
affected person (Telford et al., 2006 as cited in Khasalamwa, 2009). Disaster affected 
countries, mainly developing countries, could complement limited capability for 
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recovery by huge international aids from emergency relief to long-term reconstruction. 
Especially, the participation of aid agencies in long-term recovery project as 
implementers based on unprecedented fund was remarkable. However, increasing role of 
various decision-makers had exposed many difficulties in recovery implementation due 
to complicated long-term recovery process.  
One of examples showing the difficulties in recovery implementation was the 
permanent housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka by help of INGOs. The tsunami had 
caused severe impact in Sri Lanka including 35,322 people killed, 516,150 Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) and 99,480 completely destroyed houses (Government of Sri 
Lanka & Development Partners, 2005; ADB, 2005). Tsunami swept away belongings, 
equipment and wrecked infrastructure. More than 150,000 people lost their livelihoods 
(UN-Habitat, 2011). Because 26% of the population lived very densely within a mile of 
the coast, damage in housing field was severe (World Bank, 2005). Damage was 
concentrated in a relatively narrow coastal strip of 12 districts, covering approximately 
2/3 of the coastline like Figure 2.1 (Lyons, 2009). In terms of economic loss, ADB 
(2005) estimated that the loss only in housing, 341 million USD, was more than one-
third of Sri Lanka’s total loss, 970-1,000 million USD. It was the greatest share of total 
loss in Sri Lanka, and damaged houses comprised 13% of houses in the affected districts 
(Lyons, 2009).  
At the severe damage of houses in coastal area, the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GoSL) saw the necessity to implement coastal development regulation that had not been 
successfully enforced before the tsunami in 2004. Only days after the tsunami struck, 
GoSL announced a “no reconstruction” coastal buffer zone that varied in width from 
100m in the South to 200m in the East and North (Ingram et al., 2006). By these criteria 
of buffer zone, GoSL adopted two different programs to reconstruct total 98,525 houses. 
One was the Donor Assisted Program (DAP) for 30,602 houses by which external donors 
mainly INGOs construct new houses in relocation site for beneficiaries who lived in 
buffer zone area. GoSL could complement limited capability of housing reconstruction 
through this policy with the help of INGOs as implementers. Another was the Owner 
Driven Program (ODP) for 67,923 houses by which tsunami-affected people reconstruct 
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their own houses in situ by help of the government (RADA, 2006). Financial and 
technical support from the government was decided according to scale of damage.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Tsunami Affected District of Sri Lanka (Government of Sri Lanka & 
Development Partners, 2005) 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
15!
Largely as the outcome of the global media attention, ‘one of the largest relief and 
rehabilitation operations ever launched by humanitarian organizations around the world’ 
could be implemented in Sri Lanka (Rawal et al., 2005 as cited in Silva, 2009). Foreign 
aid donated to Sri Lanka was estimated at more than 3 billion USD with more than 1 
billion USD being given for housing alone, and as the response of huge needs, about 130 
agencies developed housing projects in their programs (UN-Habitat, 2011). While 
participation of INGOs in housing bridged the gap between required recovery resources 
and limited capability of GoSL, as a result of long process, housing reconstruction by 
INGOs hadn’t much success. Eventually, while permanent housing policy had been 
expanded beneficiaries’ number up to 120,000 households, only 16,578 houses were 
completed by INGOs-driven construction. Housing construction by INGOs was much 
slower than ODP (RADA, 2006). Besides, due to design without enough consultation 
with people and delayed schedule, non-occupation of new houses by tsunami victims 
reached to 37 %, for instance, in Hambantota. Some empty houses that were built outside 
the buffer zone by INGOs for tsunami-affected communities have ended up being given 
to non-affected households (Barenstein & Wickramagamage, 2009).   
In this research, the Donor Assisted Program case will be analyzed focusing on 
cooperative recovery process among recovery players. Firstly, most of problems in 
housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka were concentrated in DAP. Because INGOs were 
implementer of reconstruction, decision making of both players, GoSL and INGO, 
should be considered as important factor each other on an equal footing. Such 
relationship represented common characteristics of relationship between the government 
of disaster-impacted countries and external aid agencies. Therefore, it is easy to apply 
this analysis result to another disaster recovery cases. On the other hand, the Owner 
Driven Program progressed satisfactorily comparing to progress of DDP. In ODP, 
INGOs’ role was limited only as supporter and people’s decision became important. 
However, individual decision-making revealed quite wide variety of characteristics 
according to cultural or environmental background of each recovery case. So, it becomes 
difficult to apply analysis result to other cases. Therefore, this research focuses on the 
Donor Assisted Program as analysis object.   
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2.2 Previous Researches and Limitations 
 
Many researches found various factors contributed to limited progress in housing 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka (Barenstein & Wickramagamage, 2009; Vaes & Goddeeris, 
2012; Brun & Lund, 2008; Harsha et al., 2007; Hyndman, 2009; IFRC, 2006; Ingram et 
al., 2006). Silva (2009) summarized six interconnected factors that cover almost all of 
influential factors found by other researches in various viewpoints like below.  
 
First, there occurred a flight of INGOs after an initial spurt of activity centered on relief 
and recovery operations. 
Second, one of the controversial policies that the government introduced was the 
declaration of a coastal buffer zone where housing construction, including rebuilding 
of houses damaged by tsunami, was not permitted as a preventive measure against any 
future tsunamis. 
Third, resumed fighting between the government and the LTTE after December 2005 
seriously affected housing construction in the north and east. 
Fourth, the flow of funds for tsunami-affected people has been seriously distorted by 
political interference in the allocation of funds at various levels.  
Fifth, organized civil society response from within Sri Lanka has been increasingly 
organized along ethnic and religious lines in a way that was uncommon in the past. 
Finally, tsunami relief and recovery operations by numerous agencies without proper 
coordination between them or plans for cost recovery of some kind have a led to a 
high sense of dependency among the beneficiaries. 
 
These influential factors show how difficult to manage long-term recovery process 
the way recovery players intended. In the previous researches, however, these factors are 
enumerated one by one without unifying framework to actual decision. So, it is hard to 
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identify the key factor in terms of sustainability of recovery process. In such conditions, 
only normative solution for each impediment could be suggested focusing role of single 
decision-maker. Ingram et al. (2006), for instance, reviewed the housing reconstruction 
in Sri Lanka focusing on the influential factors, the declaration of a coastal buffer zone. 
Authors addressed that hasty introduction of the buffer zone policy had resulted in socio-
economic disparities, threatened livelihoods, disruption of communities and 
environmental threat by massive construction. In the vulnerability framework, authors 
suggested solution focusing on policy-maker as below.     
 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Stan and Wilma, in their paths of destruction, have created 
similar massive relief and reconstruction needs for many coastal communities. These 
disasters represent opportunities to address the pre-existent vulnerabilities of affected 
communities and to rebuild in a way that seeks to mitigate these problems in the future. 
To be successful, however, these processes require a combination of short-term 
recovery and long-term planning that involve negotiating with affected people on a 
continual basis, while maintaining distinct objectives between short-term and long-
term goals. As the Sri Lankan experience has shown, confusion between these 
objectives can delay the recovery process and increase vulnerability of affected 
populations. 
 
Only a month after the Tsunami, however, the government of Sri Lanka and partners 
supporting the reconstruction effort already endorsed a set of eight ‘Guiding Principles’ 
(details are below) before they started reconstruction implementation (the Government of 
Sri Lanka & Development Partners, 2005). Within these principles that all actors 
involved in the reconstruction of Sri Lanka are expected to keep in their implementation, 
suggestion by Ingram et al. was already included.  
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Eight Guiding Principles consented by GoSL and recovery partners in January 2005 
(1) Resource allocation based on identified needs and local priorities, without 
discrimination on the basis of political, religious, ethnic, or gender considerations. 
There is need for sensitivity to neighboring communities unaffected by tsunami. 
(2) Subsidiarity - provides for locally appropriate solutions and allows a range of sub-
national structures and organizations to be directly engaged in the recovery process. 
Recovery activities should be decentralized as much as possible, involving the 
lowest and most locally situated governance structures. 
(3) Consultation with local affected communities and stakeholders. Interventions need 
to respond to clearly identified and articulated needs of the local communities on 
policy decisions. 
(4) Communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation must be 
ensured at all levels. There is need for feedback to implementation authorities, 
grievance redress, transparent resource use and accounting, and zero tolerance of 
corruption. 
(5) Future vulnerabilities ought to be reduced – the reconstruction processes should 
reduce future vulnerabilities to natural disasters through effective disaster 
management and early warning systems for possible future disasters. 
(6) Analysis of individual interventions through conflict sensitivity (the distribution of 
aid across geographic regions and ethnic communities), sustainability, governance, 
gender, environment, land issues, and human rights concerns. 
(7) Prudent management of debt relief. 
(8) Coordination of the recovery effort in order to maximize benefits, prevent 
duplication, and minimize the burden on stretched government departments. 
 
This case shows the gap between shared knowledge for sustainable recovery and still 
remained limits in actual implementation. For another example, the principles such as 
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consideration of long-term vulnerability reduction or maximizing impact through 
coordination of associated organizations are shared among all recovery players as well. 
However, in actual process of long-term recovery, such factors are not fully implemented. 
It shows the limitation of normative approaches to decision itself and practical 
improvement of actual decision-making process. Therefore, for improvement of actual 
decisions during long-term recovery, it is necessary to analyze the actual decision-
making process focusing on decision-maker’s motives as direct cause of decisions and 
interrelation with other players’ decisions.  
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2.3 Decisions Hindered Recovery Outcomes 
 
In the disaster recovery process, involved many players make their own decisions 
almost continuously through the whole process from planning to completion in 
interrelation with other players. Although it is desirable to consider all decisions in the 
process, a few key decisions determine overall recovery process. In many researches on 
recovery cases, wrong decision, which delays the recovery progress or hampers the 
achievement of recovery goals are emphasized as an object for improvement. Therefore, 
this research will focus on analysis of key decisions as the first step. Key decision can be 
identified based on its influence on divergence of long-term recovery process. To 
identify it, the whole process of recovery will be reviewed in chronological sequence 
from the beginning phase of reconstruction planning with enough financial support from 
external actors to final phase in which expected new houses were not fully constructed.  
The timeline of housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Timeline of housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka 
 
One month after the tsunami, GoSL announced the permanent housing 
reconstruction plan with the criteria of uniform distance line from the coastline. However, 
because this plan included massive relocation plan up to 31% of total caseload, it was 
impossible to implement without enough support from outside. Based on unprecedented 
concentration of recovery aids from all over the world, many INGOs participated in 
GoSL’s reconstruction plan. However, hasty plan without consideration of tsunami 
impact and people’s condition resulted in feasibility issues such as lack of suitable 
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relocation site during implementation of plan (Samaranayake, 2006). This induced 
several changes of relocation criteria, the buffer zone until 1 year after disaster. 
Eventually, in February 2006, newly elected president who tried to quickly distance 
himself from former president decided to withdraw the buffer zone policy that became a 
politically sensitive matter (Hyndman, 2009). However, reduction of relocation zone 
meant the stop of ongoing construction project for some INGOs because expected 
beneficiaries of new houses in relocation site will return to the original place. Therefore, 
policy change was very important consideration for INGOs’ to decide whether to 
progress housing construction or not. Number of houses that was not implemented by 
INGOs due to concern about the halt by the government and so on run to 12,762 houses 
in June 2006, one and half year after the tsunami (RADA, 2006). On the other hand, 
GoSL had strong motive to promote delayed housing reconstruction by INGOs. Through 
the Revised Tsunami Housing Policy in June 2006, GoSL replaced the implementer of 
suspended projects and expected the completion of reconstruction by the end of 2006 
(RADA, 2006). However, housing reconstruction, for instance, some projects of Belgian 
Red Cross lasted until May 2009 (Belgian Red Cross–French Speaking Community, 
2009).  
According to several researches on housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka, two 
decisions are mainly blamed for slow progress and smaller number of constructed houses 
than expectation as shown in Table 2.1 (Barenstein & Wickramagamage, 2009; Vaes & 
Goddeeris, 2012; Brun & Lund, 2008; Harsha et al., 2007; Hyndman, 2009; IFRC, 2006; 
Ingram et al., 2006). One is government's relocation plan using uniform distance line 
from the coastline at initial planning phase. The other is NGOs’ temporary or permanent 
withdrawal of projects during reconstruction implementation.  
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Table 2.1   Key decisions and related decisions in housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka 
 
Reconstruction Phase 
Actors 
Gov. of Sri Lanka INGOs 
Initial Planning  Relocation Plan  by Uniform Distance Line * Participation in Housing Field 
Implementation  Change of Relocation Criteria  Temporary or Permanent Withdrawal Project * 
  * : key decision 
 
 
Firstly, GoSL's failure of relocation policy at initial planning phase of housing 
reconstruction remained negative impacts on overall recovery process even after revision 
of policy (Ingram et al., 2006). GoSL introduced uniform distance, 100m in the South 
and Southwest coasts and 200m in the North and East coasts, buffer zone in a hurry 
(Silva, 2009; Government of Sri Lanka & Development Partners, 2005). Uniform 
distance criteria were introduced without any consideration of actual tsunami impact or 
people's opinions. During implementation, the buffer zone policy incited massive 
relocation of people and remained negative impact on recovery (Ingram et al., 2006). For 
instance, lack of consultation with people who earned their livelihood at the coasts 
worsened livelihood conditions in remote relocation site from the coasts. After the 
completion of construction, it led to low occupancy rate of new houses. The buffer zone 
policy was not just an issue of housing field. It intensified the social conflicts. Social 
turmoil by implementation of the policy without feasibility became the cause of delay of 
recovery not only in housing but also in the society at large. 
Second decision was INGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal of projects. At the 
implementing phase of housing reconstruction, INGOs’ withdrawal of projects resulted 
in limited outcome of housing reconstruction as well. 65,000 pledges for donor driven 
had been made, but only 18% had been completed until 2 years after disaster (Harsha et 
al., 2007). INGO's withdrawal was occurred by various reasons including GoSL's criteria 
changes, security problem by civil war, and budget diversion to newly appeared 
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vulnerable people such as IDPs. Fulfillment of aids in housing below initial plan induced 
inevitable revision of housing reconstruction plan. It became another reason of delayed 
housing recovery. Delay of reconstruction schedule also induced low occupancy of new 
houses because some people had to find alternative way before delayed completion of 
new houses. 
Regarding these decisions, two main actors can be identified: Government of Sri 
Lanka (GoSL) and International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO). At the first 
decision, GoSL’s initial relocation policy, INGO, which has a key role in implementation 
of housing relocation plan, should be considered together. It’s same to the second 
decision. INGOs decision of project withdrawal was closely related to GoSL’s policy 
revision. GoSL and INGOs made their decisions under the interdependent relation for 
housing relocation projects in Sri Lanka. In this research, GoSL means only 
administration organization related to housing reconstruction. INGOs are defined as 
INGOs that joined in housing relocation projects in Sri Lanka. Because of lack of 
accessible data on decision-making of INGOs during recovery, International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), Belgian Red Cross, and FORUT (Norwegian 
INGO) are mainly considered (Belgian Red Cross–French Speaking Community, 2009; 
Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012; Brun & Lund, 2008). In Sri Lanka case, IFRC was the biggest 
single housing donor taken the responsibility of implementing 15% of the national 
housing reconstruction after 2004 tsunami (IFRC, 2006).       
In general cases of relocation project, affected people’s participation and opinion 
play an important role in implementation. However, in Sri Lanka case, while people’s 
role was gradually increased as recovery progressed, it was very limited in relocation 
process through INGO-driven programs (Uyangoda, 2005). Although INGOs tried to 
reflect people’s opinion at planning, it was hard to do so in practice. It was because the 
government controlled the initial process of relocation and gave only limited information 
on people to INGOs. Regarding the second decision, INGOs’ withdrawal of project, 
people’s influence was also limited because people’s role was not significant under the 
INGO-driven construction approach. Therefore, in this case study, GoSL and INGOs are 
considered as main players of recovery process.  
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Chapter 3 
ANALYSIS OF  
INTERACTIVE DECISIONS  
AMONG RECOVERY PLAYERS  
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
For the analysis process of long-term recovery in terms of interactive decision-
making process, first of all, key decisions in long-term recovery process were selected on 
the basis of two aspects, negative influences on final recovery outcomes and interactions 
among actors. Sometimes independent decision may influence on recovery process, but 
this research considers interaction between players as the criteria for key decision to 
focus on cooperative process of long-term recovery. In Sri Lankan case, two key 
decisions were identified as GoSL's relocation plan using uniform distance line and 
INGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal of projects based on the literature review 
and consideration of whole recovery process. 
Two key decisions in housing reconstruction process of Sri Lanka showed the 
characteristics of actual decision-making in long-term recovery process very well. Both 
of GoSL and INGOs consented on the common objectives of recovery. However, in 
actual decision-making process players made their decision inconsistent with consented 
principle because of multifaceted motives. Therefore, as the first step of analysis, it 
should be considered how various motives influence on decision-making. At the same 
time, those decisions were interdependent on the other player’s decision of the time. 
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Each player tried to make the best decision corresponding with its motive and objective 
under the given circumstance. As the second step of analysis, interdependent decision-
making will be analyzed with game theoretic approach. These two steps of analysis will 
identify key influential factors for sustainable recovery process from numerous factors 
revealed by previous researches.  
 
3.1.1 Motive Analysis 
Previous researches on motive are mainly conducted in economics, psychology, 
politics, and so on. As the methodology, two approaches, experiment-based and survey-
based, are commonly used. As experiment-based approaches, an experiment in 
controlled conditions is conducted focusing mainly on output as economic value (Croson 
& Konow, 2009; Karagonlar & Kuhlman, 2013). On the other hand, as survey-based 
approaches, types of motives are defined by literature review and these are verified by 
survey using rating (Fadardi et al., 2010; Ligon & Schechter, 2012; Angst & Borowiecki, 
2014; Okeke & Godlonton, 2014).  
For the analysis of overall recovery process, decision at the level of recovery 
organizations by multiple-motives should be analyzed. For multiple motives, previous 
researches analyze mainly conflicting motives such as cooperative or individualistic 
motives (Schei et al., 2011). Difference of behavior according to different level of each 
motive is analyzed (Kim et al., 2013). For organization level, only clear motive such as 
pursuit of profit was mainly dealt in terms of economic aspect (Reniers & Soudan, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2013). It is difficult to define motive at organization level regarding 
comprehensive aspect. There is also possibility to lose consistency in motive at different 
temporal points because of leader change and so on.  
In terms of recovery process analysis with organizations by multiple-motive, which 
varies this context, both methodologies, experiment-based and survey-based, are difficult 
to apply because of impossible condition to control situation for experiment and mixed 
motives in actual decision-making during recovery process. Therefore, based on 
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available literature describing actual decision and their various motives, priority of 
multiple motives will be defined, and it will be applied to decide preference for possible 
options. For each player’s preference of decision sets can be inferred by preference of 
decision sets according to each motive and its combination with the priority of motives.  
For the analysis at the organizational level, motives of organization are identified by 
literature review on documents from various viewpoints. Motives are identified at each 
decision point. Because the priority of motives can be change in different situation, 
possible decision sets can be determined based on the each priority of motives according 
to context. 
At each key decision, for both decision-maker of key decision and interacting 
counterpart, multifaceted main motives related to the decision will be defined by 
literature review. When a player makes an actual decision, various motives of the player 
are considered together. For instance, when INGO makes a decision during disaster 
recovery, INGO has to consider several aspects such as supporting the vulnerable people, 
utilizing limited budget effectively and keeping support by donors at the same time. 
Identification of such multifaceted motives became the precondition for analysis of 
actual decision-making. In the context of cooperative reconstruction among 
organizations, each recovery player can have three representative types of standpoints: 
(a) Recovery participant, (b) Cooperation partner, and (c) Organization manager. First of 
all, all players are basically recovery participants who want to meet the long-term 
objective of recovery. Secondly, in terms of cooperation for recovery, a player can be 
considered as a cooperation partner who aims to achieve the result of project. Finally, 
each player takes account of continuation of organization itself fundamentally. 
According to different standpoint, three fundamental motives of recovery actor are 
classified as Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1 Recovery player’s standpoints and related fundamental motives 
 
According to each player’s characteristics, main motives will be differently defined. 
For example, in terms of cooperation partner, INGOs have different perspective with 
GoSL because INGOs’ position is the donor unlike GoSL. INGO will try to focus on 
investment aspect while GoSL concerns about securing external support. Main motives 
can be inferred by not only corresponding decision but also other decisions of the time. 
Actual decision shows what kind of motive recovery player has.   
For each motive, criteria of decision will be differently identified as the context of 
actual decision-making. For example, although the government had consistent motive to 
meet the long-term objective of recovery, specific criteria of decision can depend on the 
situation. Criteria of decision can be ‘reduce physical risk exposure’ or ‘reduce socio-
economic vulnerability’ according to the context at specific point.   
Several motives of a recovery player are not considered as the same weight. When 
several motives influence on a decision at the same time, the priority of motives became 
important yardstick to analyze decision-making process. There is priority of motives that 
is differently defined according to unique characteristics of a player and situation. 
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Therefore, main motives’ priority order will be determined as well by literature review. 
Literature review will cover related researches, report by players, news and survey 
results from various point of view. Results of researches on general tendency in motive 
of recovery players are also considered to infer the main motives because actual motives 
in decision-making, such as political consideration, are not explicitly stated at player’s 
reports or interview sometimes (Ebrahim, 2003; Bosher, 2011; Bankoff & Hilhorst, 
2009; Werker, 2010). 
 
3.1.2 Interactive Decision Analysis 
Decision-making in recovery is decided by not only multiple motives but also 
interactive relation with other recovery players. Game theory has proven useful in the 
analysis of complex dynamics within disaster management processes (Shermemetov et 
al., 2004, as sited in Coles & Zhuang, 2011). 
Game theory deals with strategic decision-making between intelligent rational 
decision-makers (Myerson, 1991). It was applied in various fields such as economics, 
political science, psychology, biology and so on. In the game theory, ‘players’ denotes 
the decision-makers and ‘game’ denotes interactive decision-making among decision-
makers. Game theory helps the understanding of complex phenomenon as interaction 
among decision-makers. For instance, one of well-known examples is “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma” (McCarty & Meirowitz, 2007). It shows that individual rationality can lead to 
socially inferior outcomes. It can be closely related to the complicated situation of 
disaster recovery where all actors pursue ‘good’ recovery outcomes but actual outcomes 
of system show divergence from their intentions. Game-theoretic models can have 
multiple solutions as equilibrium (Aoki, 2001). This feature can be appropriate to 
analysis long-term disaster recovery that shows wide divergence in the process according 
to various conditions in different cases. 
For analysis actual decision-making as a game form, first of all, all possible 
strategies, which player can have, and corresponding payoff should be clearly defined. 
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Actual decision during the recovery process is one of possible decisions at that specific 
situation. Therefore, preference of possible decision is essential to analyze actor’s 
alternative decision according to the different condition or different decision of 
counterpart. In case of economic payoff that can be expressed as a simple number, we 
can easily decide the priority of strategies according to number. However, actual payoff 
during recovery process is complex types of benefit including immaterial benefits as well 
as economic benefits. As an example of immaterial benefits, GoSL will consider 
people’s support as benefit while INGOs considers vulnerability reduction as benefit. 
Even though some methodologies simply replace all types of benefits by the number in a 
single criterion to decide order, such approaches are not corresponding to actual disaster 
situation with time pressure to make decision. Therefore, in this research, relative 
priority among possible strategies in terms of each player’s motives is defined. By 
consideration of priority among motives, relative preference of strategies can be defined.  
According to priority order of motives in each player, preference for possible decisions 
can be evaluated. With this data, decision-making in the recovery process will be 
analyzed closer to reality.  
As the last step of analysis, to identify the direct cause of decision, interactive 
decision-making process among recovery players will be analyzed as the game between 
players based on the assumption that each actor will pursue the preferred decision if 
possible. The best strategy depends on counterpart’s decision. For example, GoSL’s 
massive relocation plan was the best strategy based on INGO’s support for 
implementation. Without enough support, however, it might not be the best option for 
GoSL any more because of big financial burden. With this analysis framework on 
interdependent decision-making, the actual causes of discordant decisions with long-term 
recovery objective will be identified in comprehensive context. Based on this analysis, 
the reason why normative solutions by previous research were not implemented in reality 
could be identified. Finally, the conditions for shifting decisions from actual decision to 
desirable and motive-compatible decision will be presented.  
!  
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3.2 Analysis of Decision on Relocation Plan 
 
First of all, the first key decision of GoSL, ‘Relocation plan using uniform distance 
line criteria’, will be analyzed with contexts of initial planning phase. In the initial 
planning phase of long-term recovery such as permanent housing and infrastructure, the 
government decided the overall recovery scope, target and method. Under the 
cooperative framework given by the government, aid agency could decide its scope of 
participation. Each player’s role in cooperation for long-term recovery is mainly 
determined in this earlier phase. 
The key decision by GoSL in the initial planning phase was ‘Relocation plan using 
uniform distance line criteria’. GoSL adopted two different housing reconstruction 
programs for 98,525 houses, the Donor Assisted Program (DAP) by which external 
donors construct new 30,602 houses in relocation site and the Owner Driven Program 
(ODP) by which affected people reconstruct their own 67,923 houses in situ by help of 
the government like Figure 3.2 (RADA, 2006).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Permanent housing reconstruction program – January 2005  
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By this policy, GoSL planned to relocate about one third of tsunami-affected houses 
in a short period of time. Not surprisingly, it required huge resource and implementing 
capacity that exceeded the capability of GoSL because relocation is more expensive 
option accompanying new infrastructure construction than reconstruction in situ. GoSL 
tried to bridge this gap of capability by long-term cooperation with aid agencies. Massive 
relocation plan could be implemented because enough number of houses was promised 
by INGOs based on the unprecedented aids immediately after the tsunami (Belgian Red 
Cross–French Speaking Community, 2009). In terms of recovery budget, ADB et al. 
(2005) estimated financial need in housing as 437-487 million USD. Within six months 
after the tsunami, more than 1 billion USD was donated to support housing 
reconstruction (UN-Habitat, 2011). Therefore, this key decision of GoSL cannot be 
analyzed separately from INGOs’ decision to take part in housing reconstruction.  
In spite of unusual complete support for permanent housing reconstruction, actual 
outcome fell short of expectation. First of all, the plan with large number of houses in 
relocation site required many implementing agencies. Consequently, when INGOs 
participated in housing construction, it was not considered whether they have enough 
experience in housing field or not. Such inexperienced aid agencies revealed several 
problems not only delay of schedule but also the quality of houses (RADA, 20065; UN-
Habitat, 2011). Moreover, hasty planning missed consultation with people regarding 
their livelihood condition. It led to low occupancy rate of new houses after completion of 
construction. Figure 3.3 shows abandoned new houses in relocation site by people 
because relocation plan didn’t reflect people’s opinion. In Hambantota, for instance, non-
occupation of new houses by tsunami victims reached 37% (Barenstein & 
Wickramagamage, 2009). In terms of resource allocation, GoSL’s decision to relocate all 
houses within uniform distance line, 100m in the South and 200m in the East and North, 
resulted in ineffective resource utilization. Finally, initial relocation plan intensified the 
social conflicts (Ingram et al. 2006). Longer distance of buffer zone in the East and 
North, the area with preponderance of minority ethnic group, than distance in the South 
was perceived as ethnic discrimination (Silva, 2009).    
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Figure 3.3 Abandoned houses in relocation site after construction (Barenstein & 
Wickramagamage, 2009) 
 
In consideration of negative impacts on whole recovery process by relocation 
decision, another decision at the same condition can be considered as an alternative. 
Above all, oversimplified distance for relocation as 100m or 200m can be pointed out as 
the main cause of problems in following process. If GoSL set not uniform but subdivided 
distance criteria for relocation according to actual inundated distance and local 
communities' condition, it was possible to obtain the desirable outcome that is consistent 
with consented objective of recovery. In the case of INGOs, if the target of relocation 
was selected according to actual tsunami impacts, INGOs could focus on supporting 
more vulnerable people within limited budget. INGO could minimize withdrawal of 
projects to cope with change of relocation criteria during implementation as well. 
Therefore, two decisions, uniform distance relocation and subdivided distance relocation 
can be considered as possible option for GoSL of the time. INGOs’ possible strategies 
were participation in reconstruction or not. As the first step of analysis, multifaceted 
motives of GoSL and INGO will be identified. 
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3.2.1 Motives and Criteria of Decision 
Both players’ main motives in cooperative recovery process can be considered 
according to three standpoints as below.  
 
a) Recovery Participant - to meet the long-term objective of recovery 
b) Cooperation Partner - to achieve the result of cooperation project 
c) Organization Manager - to keep the continuation of organization   
 
First of all, as a recovery participant, recovery player has the motive to meet the 
long-term objective of recovery. It becomes common objective of long-term recovery 
that disaster recovery improves revealed existed vulnerabilities and prepares the next 
disaster in the future. For instance, many recovery organizations adopted the concept 
‘Build Back Better’ as recovery principle. It implies to improve the physical, social and 
economic conditions of a community through post-disaster reconstruction (Mannakkara 
& Wilkinson, 2013). In this context, GoSL and INGO had the same motive, 
‘Vulnerability Reduction’ through housing reconstruction.   
Secondly, achieving the results of cooperation project becomes another main motive 
as a cooperation partner in terms of project with fixed time limitation. Regarding this 
standpoint, GoSL and INGO revealed the motive, ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. Both 
recovery players, INGO who had limited budget and GoSL who expected maximum 
effect, have the same motive to utilize budget effectively. It becomes important criteria 
for decision-making whether a strategy can utilize budget effectively or not.  
Thirdly, keeping the continuation of organization is another main motive as an 
organization manager. This standpoint goes beyond the bounds of long-term recovery 
issues and fundamentally related to each organization’s continuation. For the government, 
consideration of political factors is the result of its management characteristics based on 
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the election system. Such standpoint of the government sometimes made policy makers 
pay more attention to evaluation by people, the electorate, than the fair distribution of 
resources. Aid agencies such as INGOs, on the other hand, depend on grant funds by 
donors for their project budgets. This feature also closely related with the motive to meet 
donors’ expectation. When INGO made a decision during recovery process, INGO has to 
consider both aspects of supporting disaster-affected people and keeping the fund-raising 
at the same time. Even though it is not clearly stated by player itself, it is important 
motive in actual decision. In short, to keep the continuation of organization itself, GoSL 
had the motive to ‘Match Expectation of People (the electorate)’ while INGO had the 
motive to ‘Match Expectation of Donors’. Table 3.1 shows different motives according 
to players.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Recovery players’ main motives according to standpoints 
 
Standpoints  
Main Motives in decision 
Gov. of Sri Lanka INGOs 
Recovery Participant 
- to meet the long-term  
objective of recovery 
Vulnerability Reduction Vulnerability Reduction 
Cooperation Partner 
- to achieve the result of  
cooperation project  
Effective Resource 
Utilization 
Effective Resource 
Utilization 
Organization Manager 
- to keep the continuation  
of organization 
Match Expectation of 
People 
Match Expectation of 
Donors 
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3.2.1.1. GoSL’s Motives 
For comprehensive understanding of GoSL’s decision to relocate with uniform 
distance line, details of motive will be identified according to GoSL’s three main 
motives: ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, and ‘Match 
Expectation of People’. Based on the context and other decisions of GoSL of the time, 
major criteria for actual decision-making will be defined according to each motive. Then, 
using criteria of decision in each motive, possible decisions will be evaluated. As the 
final step, GoSL’s priority among motives will be identified.  
The government’s decision to relocation using uniform distance line from coastline 
can be understood with the motive, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’. One of the causes of 
severe damage by the tsunami was unregulated development in coastal area of Sri Lanka 
for long time. For this issue, GoSL had introduced regulation policy in 1981 and 1997 
(Birkmann et al., 2010). The Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981 declared that no 
development was to take place within the ‘Costal Zone’, in which special permission of 
the Urban Development Authority (UDA) is required for any construction. In 1997, the 
Coastal Zone Management Plan was established and specifying a number of other 
setback zones for construction and development (Birkmann et al., 2010; IFRC, 2006).  
However, coastal regulation policies could not been fully enforced by conflict with other 
policies for tourism industry or development. Such repeated failures of regulation in the 
past strongly motivated planners of GoSL to perceive that “the tragedy of the tsunami 
had one positive consequence in that it created the opportunity to address the chronic 
problem of unplanned and inappropriate coastal development” (Mulligan & Shaw, 
2007). For that reason, GoSL hastened to decide the criteria for relocation before people 
returned to original risk prone coastal area. Moreover, GoSL focused on not various 
aspects in vulnerability but only risk exposure reduction (Jayasuriya, 2006). It was 
because GoSL had no experience and manuals of massive relocation. As only risk 
exposure aspect was considered in decision-making, the relocation policy caused other 
vulnerability factors during following process of recovery. GoSL’s official defense of 
uniform distance line in relocation plan was that it is needed for physical safety of people. 
For instance, the chairman Mano Tittawella of the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation 
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(TAFREN) said, “The tsunami provided a good rational to enforce this law more 
vigilantly. This 'Exclusion/Buffer Zone' is for the safety of the inhabitants of that land 
strip” (The Government of Sri Lanka, 2005). In sum, GoSL’s criteria of decision were to 
‘Reduce Risk Exposure’ regarding the motive ‘Vulnerability Reduction’.    
Under the constraints of recovery budget, the motive of ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’ became another main motive for government’s decision. In terms of 
‘Effective Resource Utilization’, massive relocation plan that was more expensive than 
reconstruction in situ was inconsistent decision with effectiveness aspect. When it is 
considered that total loss was up to 4.5% of GDP of Sri Lanka, adaptation of massive 
relocation plan shows that GoSL put other two motives before resource effectiveness 
(Lyons, 2009). At the beginning of recovery, GoSL asked all diplomatic missions and 
international organizations in Sri Lanka for help to housing reconstruction through the 
official note such as Figure 3.4. In terms of motive of ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, 
GoSL’s criteria of decision became to ‘Secure reconstruction budget by aids’. 
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Figure 3.4 The official note of Sri Lanka for asking housing construction (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, 2005) 
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Finally, the significant motive of GoSL was the motive to ‘Match Expectation of 
people’. In Sri Lanka, political consideration had strongly influenced on the decisions 
through recovery process. For example, the composition of organizations for disaster 
management such as Centre for National Operations (CNO) was reflected political power 
struggle of the time (Boano, 2009). According to Uyangoda (2005), four days after the 
tsunami, President Kumaratunga who had been abroad on the tsunami day returned to 
Colombo, dismantled the machinery for disaster response that the Prime Minister had set 
up, and established a new entity under her direct control. CNO was headed by one of 
President Kumaratunga’s trusted advisors, but neither the Prime Minister nor any other 
cabinet Minister was included in the CNO (Uyangoda, 2005). Moreover, regional 
distribution of relief resource was distorted by political influence of each region (Silva, 
2009). These contexts support that political consideration was the main motive in 
recovery decision-making especially in the initial planning phase. Hasty announcement 
of insufficient relocation plan can be understood by the motive to show that the present 
government has enough capability to control disaster situation for people. For this motive, 
it can be inferred that GoSL thought ‘Showing situation control’ as criteria of decision 
for decision-making.  
Although actual decision was not corresponded with long-term objective, the direct 
causes of that decision can be found at the short-term motives of the time. Basically 
uniform distance relocation plan was selected because it was consistent with 
‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Match Expectation of People’. As the causes in details, 
limited knowledge on massive recovery and need to quick planning were revealed 
regarding ‘Vulnerability Reduction’. In terms of ‘Match Expectation of People’, pressure 
to response quickly for showing the capability to control disaster situation resulted in 
decision of uniform distance relocation plan. Subdivided distance plan was corresponded 
with only ‘Effective Resource Utilization’ that was considered as less important motive 
than other motives. Because the plan with subdivided criteria required relatively long 
time to reflect tsunami impact and people’s opinion, this decision did not correspond to 
other motives of GoSL of the time.   
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GoSL’s priority of motives can be inferred with relocation decisions and other 
decision of the time. First of all, regarding relocation planning, GoSL put ‘Vulnerability 
Reduction’ and ‘Matching Expectation of people’ above ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. 
Basically, relocation plan requires more budgets to implement than reconstruction in situ. 
When relocation using uniform distance line is widely applied without consideration of 
tsunami impacts, relocation plan require much more budgets. However, GoSL decided 
this plan for quick response and physical isolation of people from risk-prone area in spite 
of decrease of efficiency. Therefore, it can be inferred reasonably that GoSL put other 
two motives above ‘Effective Resource Utilization’ at the same condition. 
Between two preferred motives, it can be inferred that GoSL prioritized ‘Matching 
Expectation of people’ to ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ because GoSL put political 
consideration before actual damage distribution in relief resource distribution of the time. 
The progress of housing reconstruction by districts after 2 years in Table 3.2 shows that 
many of the new houses were built in the area of major ethnic group, the Sinhala, 
exceeding actually tsunami-affected number (Silva, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009). 
According to Perera (as cited in Silva, 2009), the Ampara District which suffered 24% of 
total housing damage, received 58 million USD of total pledges as against Hambantota, 
which sustained much less house damage yet received 45 million USD, which has been 
estimated to be almost five times its actual requirement. While only 57% of required 
houses were completed in Ampara, 188% of houses were constructed in Hambantota. 
The number of houses allocated to districts is the indicator showing GoSL’s criteria in 
decision-making at the early phase of reconstruction. Therefore, such result, which 
revealed that political consideration was more important factor than real disaster damage, 
supports that GoSL’s top priority was ‘Matching expectation of people’. Besides, 
disaster response organizations, which established and dismantled by political struggle, 
also support that GoSL put a bigger emphasis on political aspects than effective response 
to reduce vulnerability (Boano, 2009). Therefore, priority of motives can be decided in 
the order of ‘Matching Expectation of People’, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, and ‘Effective 
Resource Utilization’. GoSL’s motives, criteria of decision in decision-making and its 
priority are summarized in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.2   Progress of post-tsunami housing reconstruction in November 2006 (RADA, 
2007, as cited in Silva, 2009)  
 
Province & District 
Number of 
houses 
required 
Number of 
houses 
completed 
Completed  
(%) 
Western & North Western Provinces 
Colombo 
Gampaha 
Puttalam 
6,600 
5,639 
887 
74 
919 
347 
498 
74 
14 
6 
56 
100 
Southern Province 
Hambanthota 
Galle 
Matara 
Kalutara 
33,917 
3,193 
14,713 
8,216 
7,795 
34,972 
5,997 
13,788 
7,791 
7,396 
103 
188 
94 
95 
95 
Eastern Province 
Ampara 
Batticaloa  
Trincomalee 
61,322 
28,349 
22,648 
10,325 
36,141 
16,067 
15,294 
4,780 
59 
57 
68 
46 
Northern Province 
Jaffna 
Mullaitivu 
Killinochchi 
16,488 
9,140 
5,457 
1,891 
4,555 
3,380 
1,032 
143 
28 
37 
19 
8 
Total 118,327 76,587 65 
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Table 3.3   GoSL’s main motives and criteria of decision of relocation plan using 
uniform distance line 
 
Motive Criteria of decision Priority of Motive 
Match expectation of 
people  Show disaster situation control High priority 
Vulnerability reduction  Reduce risk exposure 
 
Effective resource 
utilization Secure reconstruction budget by aids Low priority 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2. INGO’s Motives 
GoSL’s relocation plan could be implemented because of complete support of 
INGOs. Therefore, for the analysis of GoSL’s relocation decision, INGOs’ decision to 
participate in housing reconstruction should be understood in terms of complex motives 
and related considerations. 
INGO’s decision to take part in housing relocation using uniform distance line can 
be understood with the motive, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’.  Like GoSL, INGOs aimed to 
‘Vulnerability Reduction’, too. In detail, however, INGOs focused on supporting the 
most vulnerable people while GoSL focused on entire society. It can be easily found at 
INGOs mission. For example, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
(IFRC), which had take the responsibility of 15% of housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka, 
aims to promote the wellbeing of vulnerable people by its vision and mission as below 
(Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012; IFRC, 2008).  
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IFRC Vision - To conquer vulnerability created by humanitarian emergencies and 
promote humanitarian values 
IFRC Mission - To promote the health and wellbeing of vulnerable people and to 
extend humanitarian assistance in times of natural and manmade 
disasters, through mobilization of volunteers and communities 
irrespective of religion, class, caste, gender, race, ethnicity, 
according to the humanitarian values and ideals of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement. (IFRC, 2008) 
 On the other hand, at the initial housing policy, GoSL planned to give one new 
house for each destroyed house. Because this policy didn’t consider the number of 
owned houses, it included some people who had several houses (Vaes & Goddeeris, 
2012). So, for appropriate and equitable assistance in accord with INGO’s motive, 
INGOs tried to apply additional assessment for beneficiary identification based on 
population size, damage levels and needs. In this respect, GoSL’s relocation plan using 
uniform distance line did not correspond with INGOs’ motive to reduce vulnerability. 
Regarding the motive ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, INGO’s criteria of decision was to 
‘Help the most vulnerable people’.    
The motive of ‘Effective Resource Utilization’ became another main motive of 
INGOs.  It is because INGOs, like GoSL, had only limited amount of budget for specific 
reconstruction project. To maximize the impact of limited budget, for example, IFRC 
had tried to improve design by feedback at the meeting with community (IFRC, 2007). It 
was another example of this motive that Belgian Red Cross FL’s tried to enhance 
effectiveness of budget by selecting appropriate relocation site within GoSL’s list of 
possible sites (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). On this criterion, uniform distance relocation 
was not preferred to subdivided distance relocation plan as well. For this motive, INGO’s 
criterion of decision was to ‘Invest Budget Effectively’. 
Finally, another significant motive of INGO was the motive to ‘Match Expectation 
of Donors’. In spite of other contrary motives to GoSL’s uniform distance relocation 
plan, INGOs decided to undertake reconstruction in relocation site to meet this motive, 
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‘Matching Expectation of Donors’. For INGOs with little or unstable funding, disasters 
have become an important opportunity for fund-raising, and participation in disaster 
work is thus crucial to profile (ADB, 2005; Lyons, 2009). In Sri Lanka, funding for 
reconstruction was not the major challenge because of unprecedented concentration of 
funds with unusually high proportion of private donors after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (Belgian Red Cross–French Speaking Community, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2011). 
Therefore, INGOs felt pressure to show the result of project for continuous fund raising 
rather than securing fund only for Sri Lanka case (IFRC, 2007). It was the same situation 
for all INGOs participating in recovery after the 2004 tsunami. In the recovery of 
Indonesia, for instance, according to Steinberg (2007), many of INGOs such as Red 
Cross, Oxfam, Care International, and many others had expanded their initial 
commitment from emergency aid to reconstruction despite it was not their traditional 
field of specialization, as they met an unprecedented flow of funds. However, as fund 
was available and housing reconstruction was seen as the biggest basic need, INGOs felt 
obliged to engage in housing sector (Steinberg, 2007). In Sri Lanka, according to UN-
Habitat (2011), among 500 new agencies had arrived in Sri Lanka, about 100 agencies 
developed housing component even though more than 75% of agencies didn’t have any 
experience in housing. In such contexts, INGO thought ‘Taking part in housing 
reconstruction’ as criteria of decision for decision-making.  
In terms of INGOs’ motives, participation in subdivided distance plan was desirable 
decision because it was possible to focus on more vulnerable people with limited budgets. 
However, in the actual decision, INGOs decided to participate in uniform distance 
relocation plan due to strong motive to take part in housing reconstruction. 
Unprecedented concentration of aids after the 2004 tsunami made INGO’s participation 
itself unclear. It was exceptional situation because the government strongly requires the 
support from INGOs in ordinary cases. Eventually, INGOs’ participation in GoSL’s 
relocation plan using uniform distance line was the result of one strong motive, 
‘Matching Expectation of People’ even though the decision was not consistent with other 
two motives. It reveals that ‘Match Expectation of Donors’ was top priority of three 
motives. This priority can be found at the case of Belgian Red Cross FL as well. When 
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the reconstruction project was decided, donors’ liability was considered as top priority 
for Belgian Red Cross FL. According to the report of Belgian Red Cross FL (2012), “The 
RC/RC initially chose for a donor driven solution claiming this was the only way to limit 
donor liability in construction. It is stressed that this is not the case and that owner 
driven housing construction can be done perfectly without any responsibility for the 
funding party”. It shows that the selection of construction methods depended on only 
donor’s liability. There was possibility that different priority of motives was applied to 
decision making by other INGOs in Sri Lanka as well. However, there are only limited 
documents showing internal consideration for decision-making during disaster situation, 
and Belgian Red Cross is one of them. Fortunately, Red Cross took the largest part of 
housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka, and the overall trend of INGOs’ decisions in the 
macro scale process of housing reconstruction was correspond to Red Cross’s priority.  
Regarding priority between other two motives, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and 
‘Effective Resource Utilization’, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ can be considered as high 
priority. Belgian Red Cross FL felt the pressure to promote reconstruction quickly by 
GoSL because it started reconstruction relatively late, 6 months after the tsunami. For 
that reason, Belgian Red Cross FL felt the need to show the capability and willingness to 
undertake relocation work to GoSL. Because GoSL was not keen to give land to INGOs 
unless INGOs showed the start of work, Belgian Red Cross FL conducted unnecessary 
soil tests for expected sites only for showing the capability to GoSL as described in their 
report as below (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012).  
“We decided to organize a soil test in each land that would be allocated to us in the 
near future only to show the Government that something was happening. This soil test is 
normally something that is organized by the consultant as he needs to have this 
information to make the calculations of the foundation. We were able to provide the 
consultant a complete report of the soil test before the design phase even got started. 
However, the three soil tests were done without any result as the land got taken away” 
(Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012) 
Despite they knew that it will be the waste of budget because the project site was not 
fixed, they put the motive to help the most vulnerable people ahead of effective resource 
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utilization. In sum, the priority among motives of INGOs can be defined in the order of 
‘Match Expectation of Donors’, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’. INGO’s motive, criteria of decision in decision-making and its priority are 
summarized in Table 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.4   INGO’s main motives and criteria of decision of participation in housing 
relocation plan 
 
Motive Criteria of decision  Priority of Motive 
Match expectation of 
donors  Take part in housing reconstruction High priority 
Vulnerability reduction  Help the most vulnerable people 
 
Effective resource 
utilization Invest budget effectively Low priority 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Analysis of Interactive Decisions 
The GoSL’s decision to relocate house within uniform distance line resulted in 
divergence of long-term recovery process from the expected direction. However, this key 
decision of GoSL cannot be analyzed separately from INGOs’ decision to take part in 
housing reconstruction. Therefore, analysis framework for interactive decision-making 
process by players with multifaceted motives is needed for the exact analysis of causes. 
In this research, it is considered as a game between two players who tried to select 
preferred option through the interactive decision-making. First of all, possible option as a 
set of both actors’ decisions will be defined. Preference ranking of possible options can 
be evaluated based on the multifaceted motives. For that, three preference rankings by 
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each motive’s criteria of decision will be decided. Then, these results will be taken 
together based on the priority of motives. Interactive decision-making process using each 
player’s preference will show the reason why players made actual decisions inconsistent 
with long-term objective.  
Possible options for GoSL at planning phase can be considered as two options: 
relocation with uniform distance line, and relocation with subdivided distance line even 
though it will take some time to survey the damage situation. Immediately after disaster, 
about 65% of people were reluctant to return to their original place (The Government of 
Sri Lanka & Development Partners, 2005). In that situation, GoSL could not exclude the 
relocation plan. Unlike emergency relief works, INGOs were strongly influenced by 
GoSL in housing reconstruction through plan and regulation.  It was totally impossible to 
make plan for permanent housing by INGO itself. Therefore, INGOs’ possible strategies 
are only participation or not within the given condition by GoSL. In the reality, INGOs 
joined to the government’s relocation plan using uniform distance buffer zone area. 
However, it was incompatible decision with INGOs’ all motives. To meet those motives, 
it could be considered as possible option that INGOs ask government to develop 
subdivided distance criteria for relocation even if it takes some time to make plan. Based 
on that, four possible decision sets can be defined as Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5   Possible decision sets at the housing relocation planning 
 
Decision Set GoSL’s decision INGO’s decision 
(a) Uniform distance line Relocation plan Participate in 
(b) Uniform distance line Relocation plan Not Participate in 
(c) Subdivided distance line Relocation plan Participate in 
(d) Subdivided distance line Relocation plan Not Participate in 
!
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3.2.2.1. GoSL’s Preference 
Each decision sets can be evaluated according to motives of GoSL. First of all, in 
terms of ‘Match Expectation of People’ motive with high priority, the criteria of decision 
to show disaster situation control will be applied to evaluate preference of possible 
decisions.  Based on ‘quick response to control situation’, decision set (a) {Uniform 
distance relocation, Participate in} is the most preferred case because it is the quickest 
way to make plan as well as implementation. However, even though planning was quick, 
it was impossible to implement quickly without INGOs support. Therefore, decision set 
(c) {Subdivided distance relocation, Participate in}, which might delay the start of 
recovery at planning phase, will be preferred to decision set (b) {Uniform distance 
relocation, Not participate in}, not implemented after planning phase. Finally, decision 
set (d) {Subdivided distance relocation, Not participate in} will be the last option 
because it takes time without enough implementation capability. Therefore, preference 
based on this motive is decided as (a)>(c)>(b)>(d).  
Secondly, regarding ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ especially in ‘risk exposure reduction’ 
aspect, uniform distance line is suitable decision for minimize tsunami risk exposure. 
Therefore, the preference depends only on level of risk exposure, which is influenced by 
only relocation plan of GoSL. Preference order of decision set becomes (a)=(b)>(c)=(d).  
Thirdly, for ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, preference is decided as 
(a)=(c)>(b)=(d) because the participation of INGOs is preferred option. In the viewpoint 
of securing budget from external actors, preference is decided by whether support is 
possible or not. Although the amount of financial support will be changed according to 
types of planning, both cases are assumed as the same preference because GoSL can get 
as much as GoSL want at both cases.  
When these results are taken together based on the priority of motives, GoSL’s 
preference order of decision sets is decided as (a)>(c)>(b)>(d) like Table 3.6 below. The 
most preferred case and the least preferred case are the same as (a) and (d) regardless of 
motives. However, decision set (b) and (c) shows conflicting preference order according 
to motives. Between these two options, decision set (c) {Subdivided distance relocation, 
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Participate in} can be considered as preferred case to (b) {Uniform distance relocation, 
Not participate in} because (c) is preferred to (b) in the high priority motive, to show 
situation control, as well as motive to secure budget. Preference ranking is denoted as 
from ‘A’, the most preferred case, to ‘D’, the least preferred case. 
 
Table 3.6   GoSL’s preference ranking on possible decision sets at the housing relocation 
planning 
 
Decision Set 
 
 
Motives  (Criteria of decision) 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority >      Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Match 
Expectation  
of People 
(Show disaster 
situation 
control) 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Risk exposure 
reduction) 
Effective 
Resource 
Utilization 
(Secure budget 
by aids) 
Uniform 
distance 
Participate A A A A 
Uniform 
distance 
Not 
Participate 
C A D C 
Subdivided  
distance 
Participate B D A B 
Subdivided  
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D D D 
 
 
 
3.2.2.2. INGO’s Preference 
INGOs’ preference can be decided as same manner. For the motive, ‘Match 
Expectation of Donors’ with criteria of decision as ‘taking part in housing 
reconstruction’, participation is preferred regardless of planning. Because it was only 
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initial planning phase, it is considered that there was no difference between plans except 
project participation itself. Preference order of possible decisions becomes 
(a)=(c)>(b)=(d).  
Secondly, for ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ focusing on helping the most vulnerable 
people, participation was preferred not to participate. If INGOs participate in 
reconstruction, subdivided distance plan will be preferred to uniform distance plan. It is 
because INGO can concentrate their work to only disaster-affected people by subdivided 
plan. So, preference is decided as  (c)>(a)>(d)=(b).  
Finally, according to ‘Effective Resource Utilization’ focusing on effective budget 
investment, participation in subdivided plan will be the most preferred case because it is 
possible to focus on vulnerable people. In the viewpoint of INGO, non-participation can 
save the budget at least while participation in uniform distance plan has possibility to 
construct new houses for unnecessary relocation. Preference order of decision sets 
becomes (c)>(b)=(d)>(a).  
These results can be taken together based on the priority of motives: the order of 
‘Match Expectation of Donors’, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’. For all motives, the most preferred case was (c) {Subdivided distance 
relocation, Participate in}. Regarding non-participation cases, both will save the budget, 
but in terms of supporting vulnerable people, these options become the least preferred 
case. Therefore, INGO’s preference order of decision sets becomes as (c)>(a)>(b)=(d) 
like Table 3.7 below.     
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Table 3.7   INGO’s preference ranking on possible decision sets at the housing 
relocation planning 
 
Decision Set 
 
Motives  (Criteria of decision) 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority > Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Match 
Expectation  
of Donors 
(Take part in 
housing 
recovery) 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Help the most 
vulnerable 
people) 
Effective 
Resource 
Utilization 
(Invest budget 
effectively) 
Uniform 
distance 
Participate A B D B 
Uniform 
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D B D 
Subdivided  
distance 
Participate A A A A 
Subdivided  
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D B D 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Interactive Decisions 
Government and INGOs sequentially made decisions for housing reconstruction at 
relocation site. They could know each other’ decisions through government’s policy 
announcement or MOU for reconstruction projects. This relationship can be represented 
by extensive form game between two players like Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5   Interdependent decision-making between GoSL and INGO on relocation 
planning in extensive-form game 
 
Actual decisions in Sri Lanka case were decision set (a) {Uniform distance 
relocation, Participate in} as subgame perfect equilibrium. Decision set (c) {Subdivided 
distance relocation, Participate in} is the most desirable decision in consideration of 
long-term recovery objectives. Actual decision set matched up with GoSL’s the best 
strategy, and desirable decision set was the same with the most preferred decision for 
INGOs. When backward induction is applied, if INGOs make rational decisions after 
GoSL’s both strategies, INGOs will decide to participate as decision set (a) or (c). When 
GoSL compared these two expected options, uniform distance relocation became 
dominant and rational strategy. Therefore, GoSL decided the uniform distance relocation 
plan. Then, INGOs made the decision to participate in because it can correspond with 
two motives, vulnerability reduction and match expectation of donors, in spite of 
inconsistency with the motive of effective budget utilization.  
However, there was possibility to obtain desirable outcome, decision set (c) 
{Subdivided distance relocation, Participate in}, if INGO adopted different decision 
based on GoSL’s strategy. In this case, GoSL strongly depended on INGOs' participation 
to implement massive relocation. Therefore, “Threat” strategy can be considered as 
possible option for INGOs to declare that ‘INGO will not participate in uniform distance 
relocation because of negative impacts of forced relocation, and INGO will participate if 
GoSL adopts subdivided distance plan’ like Figure 3.6.  
(b) 
(a) 
(d) 
(c) 
GoSL 
INGOs 
Uniform dist. 
Subdivided dist.!
Participate 
Not Participate 
Participate 
Not Participate 
INGOs 
Preference (GoSL, INGO) 
(A,  B) 
(C,  D) 
(B,  A) 
(D, D) 
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Figure 3.6   Interdependent decision-making between GoSL and INGO on relocation 
planning in extensive-form game when INGO declares not to participate in 
uniform distance plan 
 
In this case, GoSL had to adopt subdivided distance criteria for securing 
reconstruction budget because GoSL could not meet both of motives, quick response and 
securing budget, without INGOs’ participation. Therefore, GoSL had to compromise 
original plan as the rational strategy. For INGOs, it was reasonable action because INGO 
could get its best outcome, decision set (c) {Subdivided distance relocation, Participate 
in}, by doing so. It could be considered as credible threat. In the actual example, UN-
Habitat had lobbied GoSL to revise the initial relocation plan as soon as the plan with 
uniform distance criteria introduced. However, it didn’t work well (UN-Habitat, 2011). 
Therefore, the reason why there was no credible threat of participation by INGOs should 
be considered for practical solution. 
The reason why threat could not be made was the competition among INGOs for 
undertaking recovery work. Because of concentrated funds, among 500 new agencies 
arrived in Sri Lanka, 100 agencies had developed housing components into their 
programs (UN-Habitat, 2011). It induced exceptional competition for participation. 
Limited role of coordination agency for housing reconstruction became another reason. 
As a partnership of various players in reconstruction, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) was established for key UN and non-UN partners in 1992 (Jha et al., 
2010). However, there was no global cluster for permanent housing. Even though IFRC 
acted as a convener of Global Cluster in Emergency Shelter for Disaster situation, its role 
(b) 
(a) 
(d) 
(c) 
GoSL 
INGOs 
Uniform dist. 
Subdivided dist.!
Participate 
Not Participate 
Participate 
Not Participate 
INGOs 
Preference (GoSL, INGO) 
(A,  B) 
(C,  D) 
(B,  A) 
(D, D) 
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was limited. In the context of strong motive for fund raising, exclusion of other INGOs 
in recovery work gives position of advantage in fund raising. So, it prevented voluntary 
coordination among INGOs. Eventually, INGOs lost the change to enhance payoff by 
credible threat for GoSL.  
In terms of cooperative relationship between GoSL and INGO, competitive situation 
among INGO for participation caused GoSL’s dominating position in cooperation. As 
INGOs competed each other to secure the recovery work, GoSL didn’t feel the necessity 
for consultation with INGOs in initial planning. It hindered that a wealth of experience 
and knowhow of INGOs in housing field redeem the limited planning capability of GoSL. 
It shows that even favorable conditions such as enough funds and participation of 
external agencies can hamper the process according to the interdependent relationship. 
 
3.2.3 Conditions to Improve Decisions 
GoSL’s relocation plan using uniform distance line left long-lasting negative impacts 
on housing recovery process. GoSL’s decision was directly caused by lack of recovery 
planning capability, political considerations and regulation failure experience. At the 
same time, in terms of interactive relation with INGOs, it was because INGOs, who had 
long-term view, lost the chance to lead GoSL to adjust inadequate plan through the threat 
on participation. The reasons why INGOs couldn’t threat GoSL were limited capability 
of coordination system for housing field and competitive participation of INGOs.   
In the viewpoint of long-term vulnerability reduction, the decision set (c) 
{Subdivided distance relocation, Participate in} was the most desirable case. There can 
be two approaches to change actual decision. In the previous researches, adjusting direct 
motive of decision-maker in normative approach was considered. In this research, 
finding conditions for changing decision is presented in terms of interactive decision-
making process. 
For shifting actual decisions to desirable one, most previous researches suggested 
normative solution for single decision-maker to change motive or considerations directly 
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related to decision (Ingram et al., 2006; Coles & Zhuang, 2011). However, normative 
solution considering only direct motive cannot be enough to change the actual decision 
because one decision is the outcome of internal and external conflict of various motives. 
In the case of GoSL’s decision on relocation plan, it can be one of representative 
normative solutions that policy makers’ recognition that forced relocation should be 
minimized and planned carefully by consultation with people. However, it has two 
limitations in practicability. Firstly, when it is considered that developing countries have 
only limited capability to prepare unexpected large-scale disasters, it is impractical 
solution to expect such know-how to cope with all possible large-scale disasters in 
advance. It means there is still enough possibility to repeat the same mistakes in recovery 
policy-making at other developing countries. Secondly, even though GoSL could know 
the importance of considering various aspects in vulnerability through knowledge 
sharing, it can still conflict with another motive to match people's expectation. It means 
that only knowledge of necessity to make plan prudently cannot guarantee of changing 
decision. Because tsunami-affected people are very much concerned about the future 
tsunami risk especially immediately after the disaster, the government, which has strong 
motive to match people’s expectation, can make massive relocation plan to meet the 
people’s strong demands for relocation despite the knowledge on its limitation.  
In this research, conditions for changing decision in terms of interactive decision-
making process are considered. When GoSL’s dependency on INGO is considered, it can 
be a practical solution that INGOs make GoSL to improve plan. In the game theory, 
credibility in threat can be introduced by change of player or change of payoff system 
(Shin, 2002). Therefore, introduction of ‘permanent coordination system among INGOs 
in housing field’ can be a motive-compatible solution.  
Firstly, it can change the player in negotiation with the government. As a unified 
player, coordination system of INGOs can pursue maximizing payoff for overall INGOs 
and lead GoSL to improve recovery plan. Previous existing partnership or coordination 
system was mainly built among UN agencies, and it mainly focused on emergency relief 
works (Jha et al., 2010). For that reason, in the field of housing reconstruction, INGOs 
participate in reconstruction as limited role to supplement lack of government’s 
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capability under the government-driven policies. Reflection of INGO’s experience was 
entirely determined by the government’s will and judgment. That is why previous 
researches and report have concluded their findings in the form of advice for policy-
makers of the government. However, under the coordination system including INGOs in 
housing fields, more active approach to request policy improvement can be possible. 
Moreover, as a unified single player of external agencies, reduction of planning time will 
be possible by effective cooperation as well.  
Permanent coordination system in housing field can prevent competitive 
participation of INGOs, which became another cause of GoSL’s hasty planning. Previous 
partnership between disaster-affected countries and INGOs was usually one-off 
cooperation. Except some INGOs operated for long-term period in a country, most of 
INGOs cooperate with specific government only for limited period of recovery because 
of one large-scale disaster. In this point of view, it is difficult to prevent INGOs to 
compete with each other for increasing their own payoff. There can be high probability 
of repeating such competitive situation even in different disaster recovery process. 
Competitive situation among INGOs in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami is one of 
examples (Steinberg, 2007). However, it is possible to change payoff system of INGOs 
through permanent coordination system, which continued even after one disaster 
recovery. Unlike the single game between the government and INGOs for a specific 
disaster, permanent cooperation system between housing field INGOs for several large-
scale disasters all over the world will be repeated games. Based on this feature, 
competitive participation immediately after disaster can be restricted by coordination 
system’s penalty on competitive participation. If competitive participations were 
restricted in Sri Lanka, INGOs could make a credible threat on participation to lead 
GoSL.  
These two approaches are divided by whether a solution is based on decision-
maker’s direct motive or interactive relationship. The normative approach focusing on 
direct motive for problematic decision had shown the limitation in actual change of 
decision because multifaceted motives and complex interactive relation with cooperative 
partners determined the decision. Such limitation explains why normative solutions for 
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improve decisions in recovery process were not easily implemented at different disaster 
cases in spite of knowledge sharing. On the other hand, interactive decision-based 
approach can open up new possibilities to improve decisions in the long-term recovery. 
This research suggests the change of not decision-maker but cooperative partners, who 
want to different decision. Therefore, consideration of cooperative partners’ role based 
on cooperative relationship can be the motive-compatible and practical solution for 
improving decision. 
The applicability of suggested solution can be checked focusing on motive-
compatibility. Motive compatible solution should make the condition that when all 
players try to match their own motives at each phase, long-term recovery goals can be 
achieved as subgame perfect equilibrium.  
In the context of Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami, INGOs could have the motive to 
establish the permanent coordination system among INGOs in housing field to avoid 
their own loss by GoSL’s failure of policy-making. Such coordination system should be 
permanent one, which can last even after recovery from a disaster, to prevent competitive 
participation of INGOs by penalty. Permanent coordination system can play the role as 
unified representative that can make a policy consultation in a short time. It can prevent 
the loss of power of negotiation as well. If permanent coordination system was adopted 
in the same condition of Sri Lanka, INGOs could induce GoSL to make more INGOs’ 
motive compatible decision using the threat not to participate in uniform distance 
relocation. GoSL could select their best option as subdivided distance relocation from the 
remained options. It shows that introduction of permanent coordination system can 
prevent the failure of initial recovery policy by motive-compatible options for all players. 
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3.3 Analysis of Decision on Projects Withdrawal 
 
Another key decision of INGO, ‘temporary or permanent withdrawal of projects’, 
will be analyzed with contexts of implementation phase in Sri Lanka. It was gradually 
occurred between the introduction of buffer zone in January 2005 and announcement of 
new housing policy in May 2006. 
In the case of Sri Lanka, several problems were revealed during implementation of 
housing reconstruction. Main issue was slow progress in relocation. One of reasons was 
the scarcity of appropriate land for relocation, which was mainly caused by hurried 
decision for relocation using uniform distance criteria, the first key decision (The 
Government of Sri Lanka & Development Partners, 2005). Even though there are many 
government-owned sites, only limited number of site was appropriate to live in. 
Additionally, another reason for slow progress was that some INGOs, which pledged 
participation in housing reconstruction, withdrew their projects before completion of 
mission (Silva, 2009). In terms of pledge’s number, only 8% had been completed until 1 
year after disaster and 18% had been completed until 2 years (Harsha et al., 2007). 
Therefore, INGOs’ withdrawal of projects can be considered as another key decision 
during implementation that led limited outcome of housing reconstruction. However, 
INGOs’ withdrawal of projects was closely related to frequent change of relocation 
criteria. Because GoSL’s relocation plan became prerequisite for relocation project, 
whether GoSL change the criteria or not was very important consideration factor for 
INGOs. These two interdependent decisions will be analyzed.  
Slow progress of INGO-driven housing reconstruction resulted in delay of whole 
housing recovery in Sri Lanka. Because INGO-driven reconstruction was about 30% of 
overall housing projects, it hampered effective and timely allocation of resource for 
housing reconstruction. If INGO declared the stop of project clearly, it would be better to 
cope with such interruption in time. In Sri Lanka case, housing reconstruction in 
relocation site was completely depended on INGO’s capability, it was hard to check the 
alternatives before INGOs declare its withdrawal. 
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In consideration of negative impact on overall recovery process by withdrawal of 
projects, another possible decision at the same condition can be considered as an 
alternative. If INGOs progress projects as initially planned, housing reconstruction could 
be finished much earlier. So it can be considered as the desirable decision for INGOs in 
terms of long-term objective. However, for that decision, GoSL had to keep the criteria 
for relocation.  
Regarding consideration of keeping criteria as desirable decision of GoSL, there can 
be different views because initial relocation plan didn’t reflect actual inundated distance 
or local communities’ condition. GoSL didn’t have enough suitable sites for relocation. 
Although the revision of relocation itself can be appropriate decision regarding 
relocation sites, there was a trade-off between positive effect and negative effect because 
of projects in progress. In this research, however, changing relocation criteria is 
evaluated as a negative decision.  Although there were several positive aspects by 
revising criteria, negative impact by frequent change of criteria was much significant. 
When relocation criteria were reduced during implementation, GoSL could cope with the 
problems by lack of sites. On the other hand, it resulted in waste of budget for housing 
reconstruction that was already invested. Moreover, overall delay of investment by 
possibility to change the criteria left negative impact on the society at large. Therefore, 
this research considered keeping the relocation criteria as desirable decision at this phase.  
 
3.3.1 Motives and Criteria of Decision in Changed Context 
Although the composition of motives will not changed during recovery process, 
specific criteria of decision can be changed according to new information, relationship, 
or result of previous decision. Therefore, before the analysis of another decision, there is 
necessity to check what factors were changed between these two decisions. Before 
analysis of next decisions and motives, changes in context until about one and half year 
after disaster should be reviewed. It is because change of internal and external condition 
results in change of motives in recovery process. In here, internal change means change 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
60!
in cooperative system itself, and external change means changes in outside of 
cooperative system.  
First of all, internal change can be identified. Through initial planning phase, 
housing projects were allocated to specific agencies. It means that competitive situation 
among INGOs, which played important role in defining of initial phase, disappeared in 
the second phase. Before housing projects are allocated to each INGO, other motives 
such as vulnerability reduction or effective budget utilization were not clearly considered 
in decision. As INGO’s participation is confirmed, there can be possibility to change the 
priority of motives. For GoSL, after confirmation of INGO participation, 
interdependence between GoSL and INGOs was deepened because GoSL’s outcome in 
housing reconstruction depend heavily on INGO’s performance in construction.    
Regarding changes in external condition, firstly, lack of feasibility in initial 
relocation plan was revealed through implementation. Assessment of coastal hazards and 
tsunami impacts revealed inappropriateness in initial relocation criteria (Samaranayake, 
2007). Lack of suitable land for relocation became direct reason of policy revision (IFRC, 
2006). Moreover, another earthquake of magnitude 8.6 on 28 March 2005 without 
tsunami raised a question on objective of buffer zone (Hyndman, 2009).  
Secondly, resumed civil war in December 2005 hampered progress of recovery 
projects. Even before the tsunami, there had been ethnic conflict. However, where 
tsunami impacts are concentrated in was the place with a preponderance of minority 
ethnic groups, Muslim and Tamil (Silva, 2009). Minority groups had complaints for 
longer relocation distance for their habitation. Different distance for relocation itself 
cannot be considered as the evidence of discrimination because the impact by tsunami 
was corresponding with relocation distance roughly. However, politically distorted 
allocation of recovery resources was revealed as not just rumor but actual events. 
Distorted relief resource distribution by political consideration worsened the socio-
economic disparities and it led to severe ethnic conflict (Ingram et al. 2006). Civil war 
was direct cause for delay of recovery in the North and East area.  
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Thirdly, new president was elected in Nov. 2005 based on worsen disparities during 
recovery. According to Hyndman (2009), new president, Mahinda Rajapakse, quickly 
distanced himself from the previous presidency by changing his predecessor’s 
government tsunami response body from the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation 
(TAFREN) to the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA). Regarding another 
earthquake without tsunami in 2005, the Former President Kumaratunga stated that it 
was a logical rationale for the buffer zone, on the other hand, a former minister of 
opposition party said that the buffer zone would be ineffectual (Hyndman, 2009). Then, 
through RADA, new president Rajapakse announced in Feb. 2006 that the buffer zone 
would be relaxed. (The Sunday Times, 2006, as cited in Hyndman, 2009) 
 
3.3.1.1. GoSL’s Motive 
Change of internal and external conditions led to the change in criteria of decision in 
each motives. While GoSL was not decision maker of project withdrawal, GoSL’s 
revision of relocation policy influenced INGOs’ decision. GoSL’s relocation policy 
revision can be considered by complex motives. 
The most significant change in motive, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, was that GoSL 
started to take various aspects of vulnerability into account based on scientific 
assessment and revealed limitation in relocation implementation. As the evidences that 
reveal lack of feasibility were accumulated, assessment of socio-economic impacts by 
forced relocation was reflected to reconsider the guideline for development in the coastal 
zone (Samaranayake, 2007). It became the basic reason for relocation policy revision. By 
policy revision, people who lived inside the ‘old’ but outside the ‘new’ buffer zone could 
rebuild their homes on their own land (UN-Habitat, 2011). Regarding the motive 
‘Vulnerability Reduction’, GoSL’s criteria of decision was changed from ‘Risk exposure 
reduction’ to ‘Reduce socio-economic vulnerability’ throughout the implementation.    
On the other hand, change of relocation criteria was not consistent with another 
motive, ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. GoSL suffered from budget constraint even to 
provide infrastructure at relocation site (Belgian Red Cross–French Speaking 
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Community, 2009). If on-going relocation projects were stopped by criteria change, it 
could induce the problem in keeping external aids. For GoSL, in order to support all 
people who need new houses, more budgets was required. Therefore, GoSL had the 
motive to secure as much as budget through external aids. In this motive, GoSL’s criteria 
of decision became to ‘Keep budget by aids’, and keeping initial criteria for relocation 
becomes reasonable choice. Nevertheless, relocation policy was revised. It shows that 
GoSL put other two motives before ‘Effective Resource Utilization’.  
Finally, the motive for ‘Match expectation of People’ played a role as a trigger that 
led to practical policy change. An accumulated complaint was revealed as change of the 
regime through the presidential election in 2005. Therefore, new regime had the strong 
motive to solve accumulated problems in recovery. The Revised Tsunami Housing 
Policy was released in May 2006. Through this revision of housing policy, suspended 
projects by INGOs were changed to GoSL-driven reconstruction. At the same time, total 
number of housing support was expanded from 98,525 to 120,000. Such change can be 
understood as the intention to keep political influence by showing new regime’s 
capability to progress reconstruction to people (RADA, 2006). For the motive to match 
expectation of people, GoSL thought ‘Progress reconstruction quickly’ as criteria of 
decision for decision-making.  
GoSL’s priority of motives can be inferred. First of all, regarding changing the initial 
criteria, GoSL put ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Matching Expectation of people’ 
above ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. Basically GoSL’s actual decision to change 
relocation criteria was consistent with two motives, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and 
‘Match Expectation of People’. In details, GoSL started to take various aspects of 
vulnerability including shortage of suitable site, problems in livelihood by forced 
relocation, and so on into account, while GoSL had considered only risk exposure 
reduction at initial phase. It made GoSL reconsider uniform distance relocation. Political 
consideration was also one of direct causes to make GoSL decide to revise relocation 
criteria. On the other hand, keeping the initial policy was corresponded with only 
‘Effective Resource Utilization’. It was considered as less important motive than other 
two motives.  
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Regarding priority between ‘Matching Expectation of people’ and ‘Vulnerability 
Reduction’, ‘Matching Expectation of people’ can be considered as high priority because 
after the revision of relocation criteria, GoSL gave people the chance to decide whether 
relocate or not. In the aspect of vulnerability reduction, it was desirable for GoSL to 
suggest clear new criteria based on scientific information. However, GoSL gave the 
chance to people to select whether relocate or not. It showed that GoSL concerned 
resistance of people on changing criteria than vulnerability reduction. GoSL, moreover, 
had not taken the original sites of people who selected relocation even until 2012 (Vaes 
& Goddeeris, 2012). Such lack of enforcement induced problems in resource allocation. 
This also can be interpreted as GoSL’s worry about people’s resistance as well as lack of 
implementation capability. There was another example that matching people’s 
expectation was considered significantly. Before change of the regime in Sri Lanka, an 
earthquake of similar magnitude and near the epicenter of the 2004 tsunami occurred 
without tsunami, and the occurrence of earthquake became a logical rationale for the 
buffer zone (Hyndman, 2009). However, the same fact was interpreted in totally different 
way, as a rationale for revising buffer zone after the regime change. In here, different 
interpretation was not based on new information such as impact distribution or 
assessment of risk. Merely same information was differently interpreted. Therefore, the 
fact that buffer zone was revised based on just different political standpoints, it showed 
GoSL put ‘Match Expectation of People’ before ‘Vulnerable Reduction’. Strong political 
motive can be found at the description on situation of Hyndman below. 
“The buffer zones proved to be a political hot potato for President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, whose term ended in November 2005, at which time her then Prime 
Minister, Mahinda Rajapakse, was elected President of Sri Lanka. Rajapakse quickly 
distanced himself from the Kumaratunga presidency, first by changing his predecessor’s 
government tsunami response body from the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) 
to the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA). Then, through RADA, he 
announced in February 2006 that the buffer zone ‘set back standards’ would be relaxed 
and that the setback standards of the Coastal Zone Management Plan of 1997 would be 
revived (The Sunday Times 2006).” (Hyndman, 2009) 
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To sum up, the priority among motives of GoSL can be defined in the order of 
‘Match expectation of people’, ‘Vulnerability reduction’ and ‘Effective resource 
utilization’. GoSL’s motive, criteria of decision in decision-making and its priority are 
summarized in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8   GoSL’s main motives and criteria of decision of keeping initial criteria of 
relocation 
 
Motive Criteria of decision  Priority of Motive 
Match expectation of people  Progress reconstruction quickly High priority 
Vulnerability reduction  Reduce socio-economic vulnerability 
 
Effective resource utilization Keep budget by aids Low priority 
 
 
3.3.1.2. INGO’s Motive 
Regarding INGOs’ decision for temporary and permanent withdrawal of housing 
projects, three different motives were analyzed based on literature review. Unlike GoSL, 
conditions change induced INGO’s change in not only criteria of decision but also 
priority of motive. INGOs’ decision to withdraw projects can be considered by complex 
motives as well. 
INGO’s decision to withdraw the projects can be understood with the motive, 
‘Vulnerability Reduction’. As time went on, new vulnerable targets were appeared. 
Internally, for instance, resumed civil war has shift the attention of INGOs from housing 
reconstruction to emerging internally displaced people crisis (IFRC, 2008). For INGOs 
that originally worked in humanitarian aids field, long-term reconstruction can be pushed 
back on the priority list immediately after crisis. Externally, another disaster such as the 
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2005 Kashmir earthquake encouraged some INGOs to divert attention to the new 
flashpoint before they had completed their mission in Sri Lanka (Silva, 2009). In the 
viewpoint of INGOs, which target disaster-affected people all over the world, emergency 
response to new disaster can be considered the higher priority than reconstruction of 
houses at that moment. In Sri Lanka, RADA mentioned that of the total pledge of 3.1 
billion USD, only 1.7 billion USD had been actually committed by December 2007 
(Silva, 2009). INGO’s criteria of decision was to ‘Help the most vulnerable people’ 
regarding the motive, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’. Although criteria of decision itself were 
not changed, wider target groups started to be taken into consideration.    
The motive that became direct cause for project withdrawal was ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’. According to project review report of IFRC (2007), the progress of project 
is evaluated with four areas of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability. The 
first criterion of evaluation is efficiency, “Have project resources been utilized to 
achieve the best possible performance?” (IFRC, 2007). Because of characteristics of 
housing reconstruction requires long-term investment, housing project cannot redeem 
already invested budget when project is stopped in the middle. Especially for relocation, 
changing relocation criteria could result in shutting down on-going housing projects. It 
means that postponing investment can be the best strategy for INGOs when there is any 
possibility of project cancellation by the government. It also corresponds with the survey 
result on INGOs’ characteristics which emphasizing short-term accountability. 
According to Ebrahim (2003), NGOs and funders have focused primarily on short-term 
‘functional’ accountability responses at the expense of longer-term ‘strategic’ processes 
necessary for lasting social and political change. It shows the possibility that 
reconstruction project can be withdrawn to effective resource utilization although it is 
inconsistent with long-term objectives. Therefore, INGO's temporary and permanent 
withdrawal was decided in terms of ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’. For the motive, ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, INGO’s criteria of decision 
was to ‘Invest Budget Effectively’. 
Finally, criteria of decision in motive, ‘Match Expectation of Donors’, were changed. 
After confirming the participation, INGOs’ focus was moved from participation itself to 
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make project’s outcomes naturally. IFRC, for instance, describe the changed situation 
during implementation as below.  
“The RCM partners are under increasing pressure from the beneficiaries, the GOSL, 
donors and the media to expedite the projects and demonstrate that their usage of 
resources within the construction program is effective, efficient and creating adequate 
results for the Tsunami affected population.” (IFRC, 2007).  
To make visible outcomes in housing, reconstruction project should be kept without 
change of beneficiary lists for new houses. In such context, INGO thought ‘Making 
result of housing reconstruction’ as criteria of decision for decision-making. 
In terms of INGOs’ motives, progress of projects without temporary withdrawal was 
desirable decision because it was possible to promote delayed reconstruction. However, 
in the actual decision-making, INGOs decided to temporary or permanent withdrawal of 
projects due to two motives, to help other vulnerable people and to keep the safety of 
investment against relocation criteria change by GoSL.  INGOs’ decision on withdrawal 
was closely related to GoSL’s decision to revise the criteria of relocation. Desirable 
decision could be selected under the specific condition that INGO progressed its projects 
and GoSL kept the relocation criteria. In terms of the priority among three motives, 
INGOs’ project withdrawal was the result of both motives to prevent waste of budget 
and to support new vulnerable people. On the other hand, it was conflicting decision with 
the motive to make project outcomes.  
Regarding priority between ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ and ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’, ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ can be considered as high priority. It is because 
that INGO tried to apply additional criteria to existing GoSL’s policy, a house for a 
house policy, in order to select more vulnerable people during implementation as below.  
“This house for a house policy was not an easy policy for humanitarian agencies to 
deal with, as they intend to help the most vulnerable. This meant that a house owner who 
owned two houses before the tsunami would get two houses and squatters would get 
nothing. As the government was not willing to change their policy, BRC-FL decided to try 
and select the beneficiaries who were most in need and entitled for a house, the most 
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vulnerable among the house owners. BRC-FL gave priority to people who owned a house 
inside the buffer zone before the tsunami. Even if people owned two houses before the 
tsunami, for BRC-FL they were only entitled to one new house. In other words, we made 
sure that we did not give two houses to the same family. Beneficiary identification 
through consistent and continuous assessment, monitoring and evaluation of population 
size, damage levels and needs, should benefit the affected population by providing 
appropriate and equitable assistance” (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012) 
As the change of beneficiary can led to adjustment of plan and additional expense for 
assessment of new beneficiary list, it shows that INGO preferred ‘Vulnerability 
Reduction’ to ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. Therefore, the priority among motives of 
INGOs can be defined in the order of ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, ‘Effective Resource 
Utilization’ and ‘Match Expectation of Donors’. We can find the priority order was 
changed with previous decision. Although participation was importantly considered than 
vulnerability reduction or effective budget usage, after confirmation of participation, 
other motives had higher priority. INGO’s motive, criteria of decision in decision-
making and its priority are summarized in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9   INGO’s main motives and criteria of decision of withdrawal housing project 
 
Motive Criteria of decision  Priority of Motive 
Vulnerability reduction Help the most vulnerable people  High priority 
Effective resource 
utilization Invest budget effectively  
Match expectation of donors Make result of housing reconstruction Low priority 
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3.3.2 Analysis of Interactive Decisions 
For analysis of interactive decisions, possible option as a set of both players’ 
decisions will be defined. Regarding ongoing relocation project, INGOs’ possible 
decisions were to progress project or withdraw it. And GoSL could decide to keep or 
change the criteria of relocation. Changing criteria meant cancellation of some relocation 
projects by reducing buffer zone. Therefore, possible strategies can be defined as four 
combinations of both players’ decisions as Table 3.10 below. 
 
Table 3.10   Possible decision sets at the housing implementation  
 
Decision 
Set GoSL’s decision INGO’s decision 
(a) Keep criteria of Relocation Progress Project 
(b) Keep criteria of Relocation Withdraw Project 
(c) Revise criteria of Relocation Progress Project 
(d) Revise criteria of Relocation Withdraw Project 
 
 
 
In this case, interactive decision was defined in the viewpoint of housing 
reconstruction project level between GoSL and INGOs. Long-term recovery such as 
housing and infrastructure reveals complex aspects including not only ‘recovery’ but also 
‘welfare’ or ‘development’. Therefore, the revision of criteria can be differently 
interpreted depending on focus. Such aspect was revealed at GoSL’s decision to expand 
the beneficiary of housing program from disaster-affected people to more general 
vulnerable people in the middle of implementation. However, in this research, analysis 
objective was limited as cooperative reconstruction of permanent housing and GoSL was 
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also considered as a player of housing reconstruction. For that case, GoSL’s revising 
criteria can be considered as shutting down target project.  
 
3.3.2.1. GoSL’s Preference 
In terms of GoSL’s preference, first of all, decision set (a) {Keep criteria of 
relocation, Progress project} was the most preferred option regardless types of motives. 
Project progress without changing criteria was the quickest way to reconstruct houses 
and possible to secure enough budgets to support disaster-affected people. Regarding 
‘Match Expectation of People’ focusing on quick progress, decision set (d) {Revise 
criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} which both players make the same decision not 
to implement reconstruction is preferred. On the other hand, stop of necessary project (b) 
{Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} was the worst case. In case of (c) 
{Revise criteria of relocation, Progress project}, while INGO might lost at already 
invested project, GoSL will prefer this to (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw 
project} because GoSL can show the progress to people. Preference is decided as 
(a)>(d)>(c)>(b).  
Based on vulnerability reduction focusing on socio-economic aspects, decision set 
(d) {Revise criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} which both players make the same 
decision not to implement reconstruction is preferred. Implementation of unnecessary 
relocation by decision set (c) {Revise criteria of relocation, Progress project} was 
considered as the worst because of lost chance to convert budgets. So, preference is 
decided as  (a)>(d)>(b)>(c).  
Finally, in term of effective resource utilization by keeping budgets by aids, Stop of 
necessary project (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} was considered the 
worst case. In case of decision set (c) {Revise criteria of relocation, Progress project} 
and (d) {Revise criteria of relocation, Withdraw project}, when GoSL decides to revise 
criteria, both decision sets are considered as the same preference in budget aspect. 
Therefore, preference based on this motive is decided as (a)>(c)=(d)>(b).  
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When these results are taken together based on the priority of motives, GoSL’s 
preference order of decision sets is decided as (a)>(d)>(c)>(b) like Table 3.11. The most 
preferred case and the second preferred case are the same as (a) and (d) regardless of 
motives. However, decision set (b) and (c) shows conflicting preference order according 
to motives. Between these two options, decision set (c) {Revise criteria of relocation, 
Progress project} can be considered as preferred case to (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, 
Withdraw project} because (c) is preferred to (b) in the high priority motive, to progress 
reconstruction quickly, as well as motive to keep budget. 
 
 
Table 3.11   GoSL’s preference ranking on possible decision sets at the housing 
implementation 
 
Decision Set Motives  (Criteria of decision) 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority > Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Match 
Expectation of 
People 
(Progress  
reconstruction 
quickly) 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Reduce socio-
economic 
vulnerability) 
Effective 
Resource 
Utilization 
(Keep budget 
by aids) 
Keep  
criteria 
Progress 
Project 
A A A A 
Keep  
criteria 
Withdraw 
Project 
D C D D 
Revise 
criteria 
Progress 
Project 
C D C C 
Revise 
criteria 
Withdraw 
Project 
B B C B 
 
 
  
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
71!
3.3.2.2. INGO’s Preference 
 
In this case, it is assumed that investment was already started for housing project so 
far. Withdrawal case was considered as temporary withdrawal in the viewpoint of 
INGOs. For all motive, GoSL’s cancellation of on-going project by the case (c) {Revise 
criteria of relocation, Progress project} was the worst option for INGOs. In this case, 
INGO lost the invested budget for relocation as well as the chance to participate in 
recovery. Unlike emergency relief work focusing relief item distribution, permanent 
housing reconstruction cannot obtain result in midstream. Therefore, decision set (c) 
became the worst choice regardless of motives.   
In terms of vulnerability reduction, decision set (a) {Keep criteria of relocation, 
Progress project} and (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} are preferred 
because these are confirmed the necessity of relocation. To cope with uncertainty of 
criteria change by GoSL, (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} can be 
considered as the most preferred case for INGOs. The decision to postpone further 
investment to construction and wait until GoSL confirms that the project will be kept can 
be reasonable strategy for INGOs in spite of slow progress. It is exactly same with the 
motive ‘Effective Resource Utilization’. Therefore, preference order is decided as 
(b)>(a)>(d)>(c) in terms of both motives, ‘Vulnerability reduction’ and ‘Effective 
resource utilization’.  
 In terms of the motive to ‘Match expectation of donors’ by making result of housing, 
decision set (a) {Keep criteria of relocation, Progress project} is the most preferred. 
Among the INGO withdrew cases, (b) and (d), no necessity case (d) {Revise criteria of 
relocation, Withdraw project} was preferred to necessity to construction case (b) {Keep 
criteria of relocation, Withdraw project}. Donor will not expect that INGOs stop to 
support people in spite of disaster-affected county require continuous aids. Preference is 
decided as (a)>(d)>(b)>(c).   
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When these results are taken together based on the priority of motives, INGO’s 
preference order of decision sets at housing implementation is decided as (b)>(a)>(d)>(c) 
in Table 3.12 below. 
 
Table 3.12   INGO’s preference ranking on possible decision sets at the housing 
implementation 
 
Decision Set 
Motives  (Criteria of decision) 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority > Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Help the most 
vulnerable 
people) 
Effective 
Resource 
Utilization 
(Invest budget 
effectively) 
Match 
Expectation 
of Donors 
(Make result 
of housing 
recovery) 
Keep  
criteria 
Progress 
Project 
B B A B 
Keep  
criteria 
Withdraw 
Project 
A A C A 
Revise 
criteria 
Progress 
Project 
D D D D 
Revise 
criteria 
Withdraw 
Project 
C C B C 
 
 
 
3.3.2.3. Interactive Decisions 
In the implementation phase of housing reconstruction, GoSL and INGOs made 
decisions for housing relocation criteria change and progress projects. Both players had 
to make their decisions without complete information on other actor’s decision. At 
cooperative relationship, one-sided suspension or changing criteria can damage 
counterpart’s payoff. So, GoSL didn’t release information on buffer zone criteria change 
before GoSL determined it. In the same manner, INGOs didn’t share information on their 
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withdrawal. In the viewpoint of INGOs, temporary withdrawal of project could be the 
best strategy to cope with all possibility. For that reason, GoSL could not confirm that 
INGO’s suspended projects are permanent withdrawal or just temporary delay. This 
interactive decision can be represented by strategic form game between two players like 
Table 3.13. 
 
 
Table 3.13   Interdependent decision-making between GoSL and INGO on 
implementation in strategic-form game 
 
 
Preference order:  
GoSL, INGO 
INGO 
Progress Project Withdraw Project 
GoSL 
Keep Criteria A,  B D,  A 
Revise Criteria C,  D B,  C 
 
 
 
Actual decision in Sri Lanka case was decision set (d), {Revise criteria of relocation, 
Withdraw project}, as equilibrium. However, decision set (a), {Keep criteria of 
relocation, Progress project}, which satisfies Pareto optimality, could give better 
preference ranking option for both players than actual decision set (d), {Revise criteria of 
relocation, Withdraw project}. If GoSL keeps the criteria and INGO progresses project 
at the same time, it can be considered as desirable decision for both players. However, in 
the viewpoint of INGOs, the decision to hold project on was the dominant strategy that 
gives higher payoff regardless of GoSL’s decisions, to keep project and stop it. Even 
though it induces delay of recovery process, INGOs’ temporary withdrawal of projects 
was reasonable decision to maximize its own payoff. For that reason, desirable result was 
not selected in the reality.  
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As low feasibility of initial plan was revealed through implementation phase, INGO 
couldn't be sure of GoSL's will to keep the criteria. According to Centre for Policy 
Alternatives (2006 as cited in Shaw & Ahmed, 2010), four ministries were issuing 
different buffer zone regulations in 2005. At the same time, GoSL had the doubts about 
INGO's fulfillment of expected projects because of delayed progress. It can be 
considered as a kind of dilemma situation because both players can move to better option 
(a), keeping progress reconstruction and minimizing revision. Dilemma situation by lack 
of information sharing among participants hampered cooperative decisions that can 
achieve win-win solution. It could be achieved by mutual trust based on information 
sharing regarding their strategies and decisions. Without trust among players, even 
though outcome is moved to desirable solution, it became unstable. Because at decision 
set (a) {Keep criteria of relocation, Progress project}, INGO can get better option by 
selecting withdrawal at decision set (b) {Keep criteria of relocation, Withdraw project}. 
Then GoSL can get better option by revise criteria. Therefore, actual decision set (d) 
{Revise criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} will be resulted.  
As the reason why trust was not established, dominating position of GoSL in 
cooperation for housing reconstruction that was resulted by first key decision can be 
considered. Because of competition among INGOs, GoSL could hold dominating 
position, and INGO had only limited role in relocation planning. It prevented proper 
consultation with INGOs. GoSL decided to revise relocation criteria without 
consultation with INGOs. Lack of information of policy revision induced uncertainty to 
INGOs. INGOs decided to postpone the implementation to cope with uncertainty. Unlike 
internal players such as GoSL and affected people, it is important for INGO, an external 
player in disaster recovery, to keep the motive for continuous investment during long-
term recovery process. However, in housing reconstruction of Sri Lanka, uncertainty in 
changing relocation criteria lowered expected payoff by further investment for housing 
projects. Moreover, in terms of INGO’s key motive to support the most vulnerable 
people, GoSL’s beneficiaries selection was inconsistent with INGOs’ criteria. On the 
other hand, another chance to help vulnerable people by resumed civil war or another 
international disaster became the reason why many INGOs decided to divert the housing 
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projects’ budget to other works. It led to increase of postponed projects for INGOs. Then, 
it led to revision of criteria as a kind of vicious cycle.  
Within that process, GoSL forced INGOs to take action by threat to deprive the land 
(Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). GoSL believed it could motivate INGO to progress 
construction quickly. However, GoSL’s action worried INGOs about possibility of 
shutting down projects. It resulted only increase of withdrawal as unintended outcomes 
because GoSL’s response was not consistent with INGO’s motive. It shows that forced 
measures to promote recovery without consideration of player’s motives can result the 
opposite effect. 
 
3.3.3 Conditions to Improve Decisions 
When the huge impact by INGO’s withdrawal on donor-driven recovery is 
considered, the key issue for sustainability of long-term recovery process can be how to 
motivate INGOs maintain investment for recovery. The decision to withdraw projects 
was made based on motives and conditions including accumulated limitations of uniform 
relocation plan, political regime change, emergence of new vulnerable people and so on. 
According to the analysis on interdependent relation, dilemma situation by lack of 
mutual trust among participants hampered cooperative decisions that could achieve win-
win solution. Limited information sharing on each player’s strategies became the cause 
of lack of mutual trust. 
First of all, normative solution on direct cause of project withdrawal decision can be 
evaluated in terms of practicability. As the countermeasure to prevent to divert attention 
to other issues, INGO's long-term commitment focusing on local development especially 
in housing can be suggested as normative solution (Coles & Zhuang, 2011). However, in 
the long-term recovery such as housing and infrastructure, INGO’s motive to keep 
investment is influenced by the government’s recovery policy that can define INGO’s 
expected payoff by projects. Without proper policy that can meet the motive of INGO to 
support vulnerable people, INGOs will consider to divert the budget to other fields or 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
76!
disaster cases to maximize their payoff. In this context, it is hard for INGOs to expect to 
share their own information on possible strategies willingly as well.   
As a motive-compatible solution, the condition that makes INGOs keep the 
participation voluntarily is needed. Possible solution is the alteration of INGOs’ payoff 
by changing cooperative condition. In the previous case of Sri Lanka, GoSL allocated a 
whole construction project to one INGO. Except infrastructure construction and 
beneficiary selection, the motive to share information each other for project was quite 
low. It led to decrease of information sharing and weaken cooperative relationship as 
time went on. For this case, departmentalized participation in housing reconstruction 
based on each player’s motive and strength can be the solution. When several players 
share the responsibility of a project, there is motive to share information voluntarily 
between partners because it is closely related to achievement their own goals. Moreover, 
in the viewpoint of INGOs, this option can be preferred because it can give much more 
project output with the same input. So, departmentalized participation can be motive-
compatible approach especially for INGOs’ motive to match donor’s expectation. Shared 
responsibility can reduce the uncertainty in cooperation by preventing one-sided change 
or withdrawal.     
This motive-compatible approach was adopted in the housing reconstruction after the 
Gujarat earthquake in India. For housing reconstruction of 222,035 destroyed houses 
after the 2001 Earthquake, 37,150 houses are constructed by the public private 
partnership program. Under the partnership, homeowners contributed their own labor 
and supplement state housing grant by their saving. NGOs focused on capacity building, 
and the private sector mobilized their resources and provided management support. 
Divided roles by each player’s strength helped recovery progress. Moreover, Gujarat 
government could save the budget for long-term recovery by promoting for NGO’s 
participation after finish of their relief work through support half of budget for further 
rehabilitation projects (Vatsa, 2001; Mishara, 2008). These motive-compatible 
cooperation approaches could be designed from the understanding of different motives.  
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From the recovery process aspect, the applicability of this practical solution can be 
checked whether it is motive-compatible or not in the actual context of Sri Lanka after 
the 2004 Tsunami. In the actual interrelation, GoSL had the doubts about INGO’s 
fulfillment of expected trust, and INGOs couldn’t be sure of GoSL’s will to keep the 
criteria as low feasibility of initial plan was revealed. However, under the shared 
responsibility for housing project, GoSL could trust INGO because GoSL knew that if 
INGO didn’t implement expected project on time, INGO would receive the penalty from 
coordination system among INGOs, which was suggested by previous analysis on the 
first decision. At the same time, because of shared responsibility with GoSL, GoSL can 
get delayed projects of INGOs underway to some extent. In the viewpoint of INGOs, 
there is only small possibility to adjust the relocation criteria during project 
implementation because GoSL will loss their budget as well as INGO’s budget when on-
going project is canceled by criteria change. These conditions will lead to the mutual 
trust between GoSL and INGOs. Both players will keep the decision set, {Keep criteria 
of relocation, Progress project}, which satisfies Pareto optimality and gives higher 
payoff than {Revise criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} as the Nash equilibrium.  
When the specific condition of Sri Lanka is applied to proposed solutions, it is 
needed to consider the resumed civil war during the recovery implementation as the 
important external influential factor. It hampered the progress of housing reconstruction 
in the northern coasts because of security issue for practitioners. However, when the 
proposed solutions are considered, more sustainable process can be expected. First of all, 
by the coordination system among INGOs, postponed area’s capability and fund of 
INGO can be reallocated to other areas. At the reallocated sites, cooperation between 
GoSL and INGO will be changed as cooperation between INGOs. By such adjustment, 
INGOs, which worked at the conflict area, can be kept to participate in. As the flexible 
management of budget, GoSL can save the expected investment in that site, and reinvest 
it to conflict area after the end of civil war. This win-win solution can be expected based 
on proposed motive-compatible solutions. Effectiveness review on suggested solutions in 
terms of actual conditions of Sri Lanka indicates that these two solutions can contribute 
to motive-compatible process at each phase.   
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3.4 Summary of Analysis 
 
GoSL’s relocation plan using uniform distance line was caused by GoSL’s lack of 
recovery planning capability, political considerations and regulation failure experience. 
At the same time, in terms of interactive relation for cooperative reconstruction, it was 
because INGOs lost the chance to stop GoSL from starting inadequate plan in haste 
through the threat on participation. The reasons why INGOs couldn’t threat GoSL were 
limited capability of coordination system for housing field and competitive participation 
of INGOs. 
Normative solution such as changing the government’s direct motive of decision by 
supplementation of planning experience can be impractical solution because of low 
frequency of large-scale disasters and limited capability of developing countries. 
Therefore, credible threat by INGOs can be practical solution to improve government’s 
recovery policy making because INGOs in housing reconstruction field have a volume of 
experience in recovery planning. In Sri Lanka, the reason why INGOs could not make 
credible threat was competition among INGOs over the capacity of coordination. 
Therefore, focusing on motive and interactive decisions, permanent coordination system 
including INGOs in housing field is suggested to cope with the government’s policy 
failure. As a unified player, more active approach to require policy improvement 
reflecting INGOs’ recovery experience will be possible. Through the permanent system, 
it can resolve the problems such as competitive participation by one-off participation. 
INGO’s project withdrawal was caused by response to GoSL’s change of relocation 
criteria to cope with limitations of initial plan. The number of withdrawal, however, was 
amplified by GoSL’s dominant position in cooperation that discouraged the motive to 
share information on decision. INGO’s withdrawal decision was made based on motives 
and conditions including accumulated limitations of uniform relocation plan, political 
regime change, and emergence of new vulnerable people. 
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As direct measure for motives of withdrawal, increasing commitment of INGO for 
local society can be considered (Coles & Zhuang, 2011). However, when it comes into 
conflict with other motives such as pursuing budget effectiveness, supporting vulnerable 
people, it cannot change the actual decision. Stability of long-term project can be secured 
by increasing expected payoff in long-term investment. In Sri Lanka, uncertainty in 
policy revision became the main cause of decreased expected payoff from investment. 
Therefore, to minimize withdrawal of project during implementation, departmentalized 
participation in housing reconstruction can be considered. Shared responsibility will lead 
to information sharing for project implementation. Because it can give more project 
outcomes than single participation case with the same amount of budget, it can prevent 
INGO’s withdrawal by increasing expected payoff by project. 
From the recovery process aspect, the applicability of these two practical solutions 
can be checked whether it is motive-compatible or not. Each solution should make the 
condition that when all players try to match their own motives at specific time, long-term 
recovery goals can be achieved as subgame perfect equilibrium.  
First of all, INGOs have motive to establish the permanent coordination system 
among INGOs for housing field to avoid their own loss by GoSL’s failure of policy-
making. Such coordination system should be permanent one, which can last even after 
one recovery, to prevent competitive participation of INGOs and withdrawal of project 
by penalty. Permanent coordination system can play the role as unified representative 
that can make a policy consultation in a short time. It can prevent the loss of power of 
negotiation as well.  
If permanent coordination system is adopted in the same condition of Sri Lanka, 
INGOs can induce GoSL to make more INGOs’ motive compatible decision using the 
threat not to participate in uniform distance relocation. GoSL can select the best option, 
subdivided distance relocation, from the possible options as well. It shows that 
introduction of permanent coordination system can prevent the failure of initial recovery 
policy by motive-compatible options for all players. 
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Under such cooperative conditions, GoSL knows that INGOs will receive the penalty 
when INGOs withdraw their projects. At the same time, INGOs know the decreased 
possibility of relocation criteria change because GoSL already adopted subdivided 
relocation plan. Therefore, mutual trust on project implementation can be possible.  
Based on the mutual trust on project implementation, as the second condition for 
sustainable recovery process, shared responsibility for housing project can be considered. 
In Sri Lanka, GoSL allocated each complete construction process to INGOs. However, 
as an alternative solution, role assignment within a project can be applied. GoSL could 
divide the role and responsibility of project into INGOs, housing specialized agencies 
and GoSL. The budget for reconstruction can be shared with GoSL. When it is 
considered the amount of allocated budget from INGOs is fixed, sharing responsibility of 
budget doesn’t make difference in terms of total budget input for GoSL. In the viewpoint 
of INGOs, it will be motive compatible because it shows much more outcomes, which 
can match the donors’ expectation, with the same amount of available budget. Therefore 
this option became the motive-compatible for both players.  
In the previous interrelation, GoSL had the doubts about INGO’s fulfillment of 
expected trust, and INGOs couldn’t be sure of GoSL’s will to keep the criteria as low 
feasibility of initial plan was revealed. However, under the shared responsibility for 
housing project, GoSL can trust INGO because GoSL knows that if INGO doesn’t 
implement expected project on time, INGO will received the penalty from coordination 
system among INGOs. At the same time, because of shared responsibility with GoSL, 
GoSL can get delayed projects of INGOs underway to some extent. In the viewpoint of 
INGOs, there is only small possibility to adjust the relocation criteria during project 
implementation because GoSL already adopted subdivide plan by INGO’s threat on 
participation. Moreover, GoSL will loss its budget as well as INGO’s budget when on-
going project is canceled by criteria change. These changed conditions show the mutual 
trust between GoSL and INGOs. Based on trust each other, both players will keep the 
decision set, {Keep criteria of relocation, Progress project}, which satisfies Pareto 
optimality and gives higher payoff than {Revise criteria of relocation, Withdraw project} 
as the Nash equilibrium.  
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
81!
When the specific condition of Sri Lanka is applied to proposed solutions, it is 
needed to consider the resumed civil war during the recovery implementation as the 
important external influential factor. It hampered the progress of housing reconstruction 
in the northern coasts because of security issue for practitioners. However, when the 
proposed solutions are considered, more sustainable process can be expected. First of all, 
by the coordination system among INGOs, postponed area’s capability and fund of 
INGO can be reallocated to other areas. At the reallocated sites, cooperation between 
GoSL and INGOs will be changed as cooperation between INGOs. By such adjustment, 
INGOs, which worked at the conflict area, can be kept to participate in. As the flexible 
management of budget, GoSL can save the expected investment in the conflict site and 
reinvest it to conflict area after the end of civil war. This win-win solution can be 
expected based on proposed motive-compatible solutions. Effectiveness review on 
suggested solutions in terms of actual conditions of Sri Lanka indicates that these two 
conditions can contribute to motive-compatible process at each phase. 
When these two key decisions are considered together as a process, the root cause of 
problems in second decision can be found at the first decision. Both decisions of GoSL's 
uniform distance relocation plan and non-housing field INGO's participation in housing 
reconstruction were made under temporary specific condition. However, GoSL and 
INGO did not consider such temporary condition for cooperative partner's decision at the 
first decision phase. It became another cause to weaken the sustainability of recovery 
process.  
In terms of recovery process, the failure in initial planning phase had a lasting effect 
on players’ motives. For instance, the government’s exclusion of INGOs in initial 
planning demotivated continuous participation in long-term recovery. It led to decline in 
outcomes of housing reconstruction. Although GoSL had gradually widened 
understanding of vulnerability and expanded consultation with INGOs in decision-
making, INGOs’ withdrawal was not prevented successfully. It shows the importance of 
the early planning phase for achieving sustainable long-term recovery process. 
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In the disaster situation, information sharing is generally limited because of time 
limitation for decision-making and lack of prior information on each other. Moreover, 
the contents of shared information are limited to ‘Vulnerability reduction’ and ‘Effective 
resource utilization’, which are stated officially. Therefore, when the unstated motive, 
‘Matching expectation of people or donor’, dominates decision, such decision’s motives 
are easy to be misunderstand by the counterpart. For example, during implementation, 
both of GoSL and INGO complained about each other's low commitment for 
reconstruction projects based on the official consent on cooperation at initial phase. Thus, 
regarding initial relocation planning, the effect of misunderstanding motives on recovery 
process and difference in considered elements should be analyzed. 
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Chapter 4 
ANALYSIS OF  
DECISIONS BY SUBJECTIVE GAMES  
OF RECOVERY PLAYERS  
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
The analysis using classic game theory shows the difficulty of sustainable long-term 
disaster recovery process. The analysis also indicates the importance of the initial stage 
of the recovery process since failure in the initial phase had a lasting effect on players’ 
motives in the following phases. For instance, the government’s exclusion of INGOs in 
initial planning demotivated INGOs’ continuous participation in long-term recovery and 
led to the decline in outcomes of housing reconstruction. However, decision-making at 
the initial stage of recovery process should be conducted under poor conditions such as 
time pressure to make decision, unformed cooperative relationship, and limited 
information on the situation. Therefore, the influence of uncertainties on irrational 
decision-making of each player should be considered in detail.  
 
4.1.1 Subjective Perception  
One of revealed features in interactive decision-making process during long-term 
recovery was misunderstanding of counterpart’s motives. In Sri Lanka case, for instance, 
GoSL announced officially that the reason of hasty introduction of relocation plan using 
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uniform distance line is to reduce the tsunami risk exposure and prevent uncontrolled 
reconstruction by tsunami victims in the coasts (Jayasuriya et al., 2006). However, the 
political motive to show the capability to response quickly was not conveyed to INGOs. 
Belgian Red Cross, for instance, experienced that relationship with local authorities 
decreased at the later stages of projects, but practitioners of Belgian Red Cross perceived 
it simply as losing their initial enthusiasm for permanent housing reconstruction (Belgian 
Red Cross–French Speaking Community, 2009). Without understanding of such motive, 
INGO could not expect properly the possibility of changing relocation criteria by GoSL.  
On the other hand, when INGOs expanded their field from emergency aids to 
permanent housing, INGOs mentioned only the motive to meet local needs for new 
houses (Steinberg, 2007). Another motive to secure temporary concentrated funds was 
not conveyed to GoSL. Therefore, GoSL couldn’t expect the possible change of INGO's 
commitment for housing project according to temporary conditions. Because GoSL 
understood INGOs’ commitment based on official information, GoSL couldn't prepare 
the countermeasures to keep the long-term commitment of INGOs.  
As the causes of such misunderstanding, first of all, limited information sharing 
condition in disaster situation can be considered. Especially immediately after the 
disaster, information sharing among players cannot be conducted well.  Time pressure to 
make decision and understand damage prevents information sharing even between 
players who have cooperated each other before the disaster. Moreover, it is no wonder 
that the new external players and local players lack enough understanding of each other. 
When there is time pressure to make decision, some misunderstanding of counterpart’s 
motive or payoff will be inevitable.  
Another cause of misunderstanding can be found at the standpoint to keep 
continuation of organization. This aspect is not well shared by official communication 
between players in cooperative process, but it strongly influences on decision-making. 
Therefore, officially unstated motive related to continuation of organization can be 
considered as another cause of misunderstanding. 
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As Sri Lanka case shows, misunderstanding occurred in the early phase of long-term 
disaster recovery. It is important to understand the characteristics of motive 
misunderstanding between recovery players because of its influence on whole recovery 
process. However, the classical game theoretic frame cannot analyze subjective 
perception aspect clearly. For that reason, hypergame approach based on subjective 
perception of each player will be applied for analysis of decision of initial relocation 
planning focusing on misunderstanding aspect. 
 
4.1.2 Hypergame Analysis 
Hypergame built up from ‘classical’ game theory, but modified and expanded the 
game-theoretic framework to represent real-life (Bennett, 1980). It emphasized on 
problem formulation as the crucial element in decision-making process (Bennett & 
Dando, 1979). In terms of problem formulation, hypergame approach discarded the basic 
assumption of game theory that “all players see the same game” (Bennett & Dando, 
1979). Based on the actual situation in which players are not correctly informed of each 
other’s strategies and preferences, hypergame deals with different perception on the 
same strategies, and Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the difference in a two-player game and a 
simple two-player hypergame (Bennett, 1980). Figure 4.1 shows the classic game in 
which preference of strategies is defined as one regardless of players. On the other hand, 
Figure 4.2 shows that players’ games are differently defined according to their own 
subjective perception in the structure of hypergame. For the same player’s strategies set, 
subjective perception can differently define the other’s strategies itself as well as 
preference of decision sets. The final outcome of games can be decided by the 
combination of each individual games.  
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p, q are the players 
Sp represents p’s strategy set 
Sq represents q’s strategy set 
>p is the ordering of p’s preference over 
the outcomes of the game;  
we write s >p t to means ‘p prefers s to t’ 
(One outcome ‘cell’ is shown) 
>q similarly denotes q’s preference 
 
Figure 4.1   The structure of a two-player game (Bennett, 1980) 
 
 
 
 
Player p’s game: 
Spp (=Sp) is p’s perception of his own strategy 
set 
Sqp is p’s perception of q’s strategy set  
Each outcome ‘cell’ contains an expression of 
p’s preference for that outcome, >pp (=>p) and 
his perception of q’s preference, >qp  
Player q’s game: 
Spq is q’s perception of p’s strategy set 
Sqq (=Sq) is q’s perception of his own strategy 
set  
Each outcome ‘cell’ contains an expression of 
q’s perception of p’s preference for that 
outcome, >pq and his own perception, >qq (=>q) 
 
Figure 4.2   The structure of a simple two-player hypergame (Bennett, 1980) 
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In the previous research, hypergame studies dealt with decisions in the context of 
warfare, business competition, social issue, etc. (Bennett & Dando, 1979; Hamandawana 
et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 1980).  
For instance, according to the research by Bennett et al. (1980), ‘soccer hooliganism’, 
one of the social conflicts, can be considered as an interaction between two parties, 
hooligan fans and authorities. Two involved players form each own individual game 
based on different perception of the “game” being played. In the viewpoint of the 
hooligan fans, fans make decision on preference of fans’ possible strategies such as 
“orderly behavior”, “play hooligan”, and “real hooliganism” according to their 
expectation on authorities’ possible response, “tough response” or “tolerant response”. 
As the decision set, {Fan, Authority}, hooligan fans’ the most preferred case is {Play 
hooligan, Tolerant response}, and the least preferred case is {Orderly behavior, Tough 
response}. For the authorities’ preference, fans believe that the most preferred case is 
{Orderly behavior, Tolerant response}, and the least preferred case is {Real hooliganism, 
Tolerant response}. Therefore, based on the subjectively perceived interaction, fans will 
decide to “play hooligan” as their best strategy in expectation of authorities’ “tolerant 
response”.  
In the same manner, the authorities decide to adopt a “wait and see” policy, 
observing the fans’ behavior and being ready to act if necessary. However, the 
authorities can perceive fan’s playing hooligan, not hooliganism, as “unacceptable 
behavior”, which induce authorities’ “intervention”. Consequently, fans can do “real 
hooliganism” when fans think that authorities intervention is “tough response”. This 
interaction process explains that different perception on the same response became the 
cause of occurrence of unwanted level of violence (Bennett et al., 1980). 
Although previous researched focused on conflict situation, it can be applicable to 
disaster situation especially at the early phase. Subjective perception plays important role 
in decision of strategies because of conditions in disaster situation such as limited 
sharing of information among players. This approach can reveal the influence of 
subjective definition of key concept or criteria on recovery outcomes. 
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For the analysis using hypergame approach, first of all, strategies of players will be 
defined according to each player’s perspective. Subjective perspective on counterpart’s 
preference order will be identified according to shared information and the 
characteristics of each recovery player. Individual game based on interpretation of others 
will be analyzed in the context of each player. By mapping of both individual games, the 
influence of misunderstanding on recovery process will be discussed. Finally, the 
practical solution will be discussed. 
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4.2 Analysis of Individual Subjective Games 
 
Basically, players’ strategies are differently defined according to each actor’s 
viewpoint. However, in the case of relocation planning in Sri Lanka, players’ possible 
strategies are limited and relatively clear for both actors. Therefore, decision sets are 
identically defined for both GoSL and INGO as Table 4.1 below. It is the same as Table 
3.4. 
 
Table 4.1   Possible decision sets at the housing relocation planning 
 
Decision Set GoSL’s decision INGO’s decision 
(a) Uniform distance line Relocation plan Participate in 
(b) Uniform distance line Relocation plan Not Participate in 
(c) Subdivided distance line Relocation plan Participate in 
(d) Subdivided distance line Relocation plan Not Participate in 
 
 
As the next step, each player can establish its own individual game based on its 
subjective perception. First of all, the player’s own preference can be considered as same 
as previous analysis in Chapter 3. GoSL’s perspective on INGO’s preference, and 
INGO’s perspective on GoSL’s preference should be defined according to shared 
information.  
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4.2.1 GoSL’s Subjective Game 
For definition of subjective perception on counterpart’s preference, it is needed to 
clarify the shared information and unshared information between players. First of all, 
only motive-related information is considered in this research. The criteria to decide 
shared or not are whether receiver recognizes that information or not. It is because main 
focus is to constitute the subjective perception. Official information that was published is 
also considered as shared information. Due to limited data on information sharing in 
recovery process, some information was inferred based on each player’s 
misunderstanding of counterpart. For instance, INGOs consider minimizing donor’s 
liability as one of important criteria of decision when INGO select the way of 
participation in housing (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). However, such information was not 
shared with GoSL. Such information was classified according to motives as Table 4.2 
below. It is noted with O / X whether information is shared to GoSL or not.     
 
Table 4.2   INGO’s information sharing for cooperation with GoSL  
 
 
Motive Criteria of Decision Related Information Sharing 
Match expectation 
of donors  
Take part in housing 
reconstruction 
Dependency on donation X 
Minimize donor's liability X 
Appealing for fund-raising X 
Vulnerability 
reduction  
Help the most 
vulnerable people 
Main target for supporting  O 
Criteria for select target X 
Effective resource 
utilization 
Invest Budget 
Effectively 
Available amount of fund O 
Available amount of 
manpower O 
Capability in housing fields X 
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When these factors are not shared with others, it is possible to assume that each 
player makes decision based on only subjectively perceived counterpart's payoff. 
 
4.2.1.1. GoSL’s perspective on INGO’s preference  
First of all, in the GoSL’s perception on INGOs’ motives, the motive to ‘Match 
expectation of donors’ is not clearly revealed because such information was only 
mentioned at the internal report of INGOs.  
For ‘Vulnerability reduction’, detailed information of criteria to select target was not 
shared to GoSL. In the viewpoint of GoSL, this motive can be misunderstood as to help 
as many people as possible. In actual case, although INGOs tried to figure out more 
vulnerable people from the initial list of beneficiaries given by GoSL, INGOs didn’t 
point out the fairness problem to GoSL at the early phase of participation because INGO 
pay more attention to participation itself (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). For participation in 
housing reconstruction, INGOs tried to show their capability to implement reconstruction 
to GoSL. Therefore, GoSL might perceive ‘to help as many people as possible’ as 
INGOs’ main consideration factor. In this point of view, decision set (a) {Uniform 
distance relocation, Participate in} is preferred to decision (c) {Subdivided distance 
relocation, Participate in} because more people can be supported by decision (a). 
Therefore, INGO’s preference order of decision sets is perceived as (a)>(c)>(b)=(d) by 
GoSL.  
In terms of ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, GoSL managed the overall housing 
reconstruction and each INGO took only small part of responsibility for implementation. 
Despite INGO thought uniform distance plan as the least preferred case to subdivided 
distance plan, GoSL might consider that all participation cases are equally preferred by 
INGOs. Therefore, preference based on this motives will be decided as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d).  
 Within obviously revealed motives, vulnerability reduction was officially 
emphasized than effectiveness of resource utilization. For instance, in the project review 
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report of IFRC (2007), the progress of project is evaluated with four main areas: 
efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability as below.  
Efficiency – “Have project resources been utilized to achieve the best possible 
performance?”  
Effectiveness – “Have the projects achieved the set objectives?” 
Relevance – “Does the project make sense in meeting the long term shelter needs of 
tsunami affected people, and why? 
Sustainability – “Does the project offer the beneficiary an opportunity to reap lasting 
benefits?” (IFRC, 2007). 
Except only efficiency, other three criteria are closely related to vulnerability 
reduction issue. When these results are taken together based on the priority of motives, 
GoSL’s perspective on INGO’s preference order of decision sets is decided as 
(a)>(c)>(b)=(d) as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3   GoSL’s perspective on INGO’s preference ranking on possible decision sets 
at the housing relocation planning 
 
Decision Set 
Motives  (Criteria of Decision) 
 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority > Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Help as many people 
as possible) 
Effective Resource 
Utilization 
(Invest budget 
effectively) 
Uniform 
distance 
Participate A A A 
Uniform 
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D D 
Subdivided  
distance 
Participate B A B 
Subdivided  
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D D 
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4.2.1.2. Analysis of GoSL’s Subjective Game 
GoSL can define GoSL’s individual game with GoSL its own preference and INGOs 
preference perceived by GoSL. Individual game of GoSL is shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3   GoSL’s Individual game with decision-making on relocation planning  
 
In this case, preference of INGO is differently defined, but the outcome itself is 
revealed as the same with previous analysis using classical game approach, decision set 
(a) {Uniform distance relocation, Participate in}. However, INGO’s preference order is 
differently perceived by GoSL as below.  
 
INGO’s preference for that outcome,      (c) >ii (a) >ii (d) =ii (b) 
GoSL perception of INGO’s preference, (a) >ig (c) >ig (d) =ig (b) 
 
It indicates that INGO’s preference on GoSL’s relocation criteria when INGO 
participate in is differently perceived. It means GoSL might think that INGOs prefer 
{Uniform distance relocation, Participate in} to {Subdivided distance relocation, 
Participate in}. Even though INGO declares the threat as INGO will not participate in 
(b) 
(a) 
(d) 
(c) 
GoSL 
INGOs 
Uniform dist. 
Subdivided dist.!
Participate 
Not Participate 
Participate 
Not Participate 
INGOs 
Preference (GoSL, INGO) 
(A,  A) 
(C,  D) 
(B,  B) 
(D, D) 
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uniform distance plan, it will be incredible threat for GoSL who believes that INGOs 
prefer {Uniform distance relocation, Participate in} to {Subdivided distance relocation, 
Participate in}. This misunderstanding can explain why some INGOs’ threat was not 
successful for GoSL.  
 
4.2.2 INGO’s Subjective Game 
For identifying INGO’s perspective on GoSL’s preference, it is needed to clarify the 
shared information and unshared information from GoSL to INGO. In terms of GoSL’s 
information that was shared or unshared can be listed up as Table 4.4 below (Vaes & 
Goddeeris, 2012; I-FREED, 2005). It is noted with O / X whether information is shared 
to INGO or not.  
 
Table 4.4   GoSL’s information sharing for cooperation with INGOs  
 
 
Motive Criteria of Decision Related Information Sharing 
Match 
expectation of 
people  
Show disaster 
situation control 
Political conflict among parties X 
Political influence on policy 
(Possibility of interference)  X 
Vulnerability 
reduction  Reduce risk exposure 
Disaster damage situation  O 
Necessity of coastal regulation  O 
Beneficiaries information X 
Effective 
resource 
utilization 
Secure budget by aids 
Required budget for recovery O 
Site information for relocation O 
Construction information 
(Floor plan, etc.) O 
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For example, information on beneficiaries was not transferred to INGO at the early 
phase of reconstruction. Such situation can be found at the description on the project of 
the Norwegian/Swedish INGO, FORUT, in the Eastern Province. 
“Various organizations that obtained access to land from the Addalaichennai 
authorities to build a specific number of houses in Oluvil found that they did not know 
who they were building for as the Sri Lankan government only made beneficiary lists 
available after new houses were completed.” (Brun & Lund, 2008) 
In the other reconstruction case for 100 houses by collaboration between I-FREED 
and SUCCESS, GoSL gave the basic information of construction site and floor plan 
through the official document as Figure 4.4 (I-FREED, 2005).   
 
 
Figure 4.4   Information on the floor plan and sites from GoSL (I-FREED, 2005) 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
!
96!
4.2.2.1. INGO’s perspective on GoSL’s preference  
In the INGO’s subjective perception, GoSL’s political motives are not considered. 
According to Khasalamwa’s research (2009) focusing on post-tsunami interventions in 
Sri Lanka, the role of political patronage shapes access to resource. In that research, the 
overprovision of housing in the south was suggested an evidence of inequitable 
allocation of resources from a national perspective. However, INGOs were hard to be 
aware of such regional imbalance in resource allocation especially in the early stage of 
reconstruction because ethnic segregation was not revealed at individual project level.  
Regarding ‘Vulnerability Reduction’, GoSL officially announced that the reason of 
uniform distance relocation is to prevent repeated failure of coastal regulation (Birkman 
et al., 2010). Therefore, consideration factor in ‘Vulnerability Reduction’ is mainly 
considered as ‘enforcing coastal regulation’. In the disaster situation, it is impossible for 
INGO grasp the necessary information especially on disaster-affected people. The 
government can deliver information between people and INGOs in general recovery 
cases. However, because of centralized political structure of Sri Lanka, there was no 
regional institution to do so (Uyangoda, 2005).  Moreover, GoSL didn’t share enough 
information on expected beneficiary with INGOs (Vaes & Goddeeris, 2012). In terms of 
coastal regulation, preference order is determined according to relocation criteria as 
(a)=(b)>(c)=(d). 
For ‘Effective Resource Utilization’, information on disaster damage and needs was 
relatively clearly shared to INGO. Through the official note to all diplomatic missions 
and international organizations, GoSL officially announce the necessity of external 
support to construct houses for tsunami-affected people (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Sri Lanka, 2005). Through such documents, INGOs could recognize the GoSL’s 
motive to secure reconstruction budget by aids. In the budget aspect, preference of 
decision sets will be evaluated based on participation as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). 
Within obviously revealed two motives, vulnerability reduction was officially 
emphasized than effectiveness of resource utilization. At the report of GoSL on 
reconstruction progress, vulnerability reduction is mainly mentioned as target of disaster 
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recovery (The Government of Sri Lanka and Development partners, 2005). Guiding 
principles, which are consented by all players at the beginning of reconstruction, can be 
another evidence on INGO’s perspective on GoSL’s preference. Among eight guiding 
principles, vulnerability reduction is much more emphasized than effectiveness of 
resource utilization (The Government of Sri Lanka and Development partners, 2005). 
For instance, vulnerability issue is mentioned directly or indirectly at these principles 
such as ‘Future vulnerability ought to be reduced’ and ‘Consultation with local affected 
communities and stakeholders’. On the other hand, only one principle, ‘Coordination is 
essential to maximize benefits and prevent duplication’ is related to effectiveness aspect 
focusing on maximizing impact.  
When these results are taken together based on the priority of motives, INGO’s 
perspective on GoSL’s preference order of decision sets can be decided as 
(a)>(b)>(c)>(d) as Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5   INGO’s perspective on GoSL’s preference ranking on possible decision sets 
at the housing relocation planning 
 
Decision Set 
Motives  (Consideration factors) 
Preference 
Ranking 
High Priority > Low Priority 
GoSL INGOs 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
(Enforcing coastal 
regulation) 
Effective Resource 
Utilization 
(Secure budget 
by aids) 
Uniform 
distance 
Participate A A A 
Uniform 
distance 
Not 
Participate 
A D B 
Subdivided  
distance 
Participate D A C 
Subdivided  
distance 
Not 
Participate 
D D D 
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4.2.2.2. Analysis of INGO’s Subjective Game 
 
INGO can define INGO’s individual game with INGO its own preference and 
GoSL’s preference subjectively perceived by INGO.  Individual game of INGO is shown 
in Figure 4.5.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5   INGO’s individual game with decision-making on relocation planning 
 
Like GoSL’s individual game, the preference order of GoSL, which is perceived by 
INGOs, is differently defined but outcome itself was revealed as the same with analysis 
using classical game approach in Chapter 3. However, change of priority shows 
meaningful implication when INGO tries to force GoSL to desirable decision. In the case 
INGO declare not participate in with uniform distance relocation, only three option will 
be compared for GoSL like below.   
 
GoSL’s preference for that outcome,      (c) >gg (b) >gg (d) 
INGO perception of GoSL’s preference, (b) >gi (c) >gi (d) 
 
(b) 
(a) 
(d) 
(c) 
GoSL 
INGOs 
Uniform dist. 
Subdivided dist.!
Participate 
Not Participate 
Participate 
Not Participate 
INGOs 
Preference (GoSL, INGO) 
(A,  B) 
(B,  C) 
(C,  A) 
(D, D) 
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If INGOs perceived GoSL’s preference that (b) {Uniform distance relocation, Not 
participate in} is preferred to (c) {Subdivided distance relocation, Participate in}, INGO 
would not make the threat to change GoSL’s decision. Even though INGO declares that 
INGO will not participate in uniform distance relocation, GoSL’s best strategy will be 
the same as uniform distance relocation, decision set (b) as Figure 4.6. In this context, 
the reason why INGOs didn’t make credible threat can be clearly explained. Under 
limited information sharing situation, officially emphasized motive to reduce risk 
exposure was misleading as the motive to keep uniform distance plan regardless INGO’s 
strategies.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6   INGO’s Individual game on relocation planning when INGO declares not to 
participate in uniform distance plan 
 
 
  
(b) 
(a) 
(d) 
(c) 
GoSL 
INGOs 
Uniform dist. 
Subdivided dist.!
Participate 
Not Participate 
Participate 
Not Participate 
INGOs 
Preference (GoSL, INGO) 
(A,  B) 
(B,  C) 
(C,  A) 
(D, D) 
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4.3 Analysis of Hypergame 
 
As the result of hypergame analysis, the outcomes of interactive decision itself are 
the same with previous analysis in both subjectively perceived individual games. This 
results support the robustness of actual decision, {Uniform distance relocation, 
Participate in}, as equilibrium at initial planning phase. At the same time, 
misunderstanding, which represented as differently perceived counterpart’s preference 
order with actual preference, became one of causes that prevented desirable decision in 
terms of long-term recovery objectives.  
For GoSL’s subjective game, GoSL perspective on INGO’s preference is needed. 
Because INGOs’ information related to budget investment effectiveness is mainly shared 
with GoSL, GoSL might infer that INGO will focusing on helping a many people as 
possible. In this context, although INGO declares {Participate if GoSL takes subdivided 
distance policy, Not participate if GoSL takes uniform distance policy} as a threat, GoSL 
might not trust the threat because, according to GoSL’s subjective perception, INGOs 
had to abandon their best option by threat.  
On the other hand, in INGOs’ subjective game, GoSL’s motives to uniform distance 
relocation are perceived as GoSL officially announced. According to INGO’s 
subjectively perceived preference of GoSL, even though INGOs declare not to 
participate if GoSL takes uniform distance policy, GoSL will keep the uniform distance 
line policy for reducing risk exposure. This misunderstanding might discourage INGOs’ 
motive to make the threat for GoSL. Therefore, it indicates that misunderstanding of 
counterpart’s strategies in the early stage of recovery resulted in missing the opportunity 
to improve decision on relocation.    
In terms of recovery process, misunderstanding in earlier phase is important to keep 
the cooperative relationship for long time. To sustain cooperative projects with INGOs, 
GoSL should pay attention to understand INGOs actual motives. In Sri Lanka case, to 
start housing reconstruction by support of INGOs, each INGOs’ capability or motives 
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were not enough considered to allocate projects. Because the dominant position of GoSL 
in cooperative relation prevented to solve misunderstanding, lasting misunderstanding 
accelerated withdrawal by INGOs.  
This analysis using hypergame indicates the importance of information sharing 
between cooperative partners for recovery. Increasing cooperation with various players is 
inevitable because cooperation with external players is substituted for the limited 
capability of the government in disaster recovery. Although, in Sri Lanka case, the 
outcomes as decision set are not differently evaluated whether misunderstanding is 
considered or not, misunderstanding of other player’s strategy can change the key 
decision in more sensitive conditions by changing perceived preference order. For 
sustainable cooperation between various players, information sharing especially on each 
other’s motive in recovery should be carefully conducted. 
As one of practical solutions to reduce misunderstanding, the list of information for 
NGO registration system for government can be considered. World Bank suggested that 
the government should assessment the capacity of all NGOs to allocate the role and 
coordinate NGOs (Jha et al., 2010). Especially for INGOs entering disaster-affected 
country for the first time, the formal registration system is recommended to identify 
organizations’ constituency, capacity, technical skills, etc. as Table. 4.6. Suggested data 
except basic information such as ‘Name’ and ‘Contact information’ can be categorized 
according to related motives of INGOs. First of all, most information is related to motive 
of ‘Effective resource utilization’. For instance, ‘Experience’, ‘Expertise’ and ‘Financial 
capacity’ are those information. Secondly, regarding to the motive of ‘Vulnerability 
reduction’, ‘Beneficiary screening criteria’ is recommended. However, the motive to 
‘Match expectation of donors’ can be inferred only partially from ‘Financial capacity 
(source of fund)’. This list shows the reason why misunderstanding is occurred between 
the government and INGOs. Most of information is focused on project itself for effective 
cooperation, which is mainly related to the motive of ‘Effective resource utilization’. 
Relatively other two motives are not considered in detail. Therefore, to prevent 
misunderstanding counterpart’s strategies, more detailed information regarding other two 
motives, such as ‘Stability of funding part’ or ‘Reporting method to donors’, should be 
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considered. Using the improved list of registration system, which covers INGOs’ 
multifaceted motives properly, the government can easily predict INGOs’ strategies 
during the recovery process. This approach can reduce unnecessary misunderstanding 
especially at the early phase of long-term recovery.   
 
 
Table 4.6   Data for NGO Registration System (Jha et al., 2010) 
Data Purpose 
Name Legal name and doing-business-as name, internationally and locally. 
Legal status 
National or international organization. Type of incorporation or other 
legal status. Legal basis for receiving funds from international and/or 
national sources. Permission to operate in the country. 
Experience 
Experience in the affected country and/or region and in similar post-
disaster reconstruction activities. Supervisory structure, and 
experience of senior officials. 
Expertise Principal services: financial, technical assistance, human resources. Language skills of staff. Systems for project management. 
Beneficiary 
screening criteria 
Screening criteria for beneficiaries, especially philosophical or 
religious preconditions, if any. 
Financial capacity 
Financial management capacity. Availability and source of own 
funds. Experience with managing government and other outside 
funds. Ability to present accurate and timely financial information. 
Institutional 
contacts 
Headquarters and institutional information, including names of senior 
management and board members. 
Contact 
information Location of office, telephone, fax, Web site, e-mail address. 
 
 
Finally, suggested practical solution in Chapter 3, permanent coordination system 
among INGOs in housing field, can be evaluated in the context of uncertainty. First of all, 
with the permanent coordination system among INGOs, GoSL could recognize that the 
INGOs’ threat had high possibility of realization because coordination system can 
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regulate the overall participation of INGOs as a unified player who pursue maximizing 
INGOs’ payoff. Moreover, INGOs can be easy to understand the political motive of the 
government through the internal information sharing from INGOs, which had worked in 
that country for a long time. These aspects support that suggested practical solution can 
be helpful to overcome the uncertainty in the early phase of recovery.    
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION  
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
5.1.1 Summary  
Long-term disaster recovery such as infrastructure and housing reconstruction, 
especially in developing countries, is a crucial phase in terms of sustainable development 
as well as disaster resilience. Increasing roles of various players including International 
Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) and the private sector make it hard to manage 
implementation process and achieve the expected goals. Even though there is common 
consent on the idealistic aim, it is hard to achieve long-term recovery goals effectively. It 
is because each recovery player has multifaceted motives, which vary with the context, 
and makes interactive decisions with other players for cooperation. In reality, there are 
many unexpected situation after disaster impacts. In such urgent situations to take action 
for recovery, it is almost impossible to make perfectly rational decision. Therefore, 
identifying the mechanism of actual decision-making in disaster recovery can contribute 
to achieve long-term objectives through sustainable recovery process.  
Previous researches on long-term recovery have mainly focused on identifying 
desirable decision and efficient strategies. However, consideration on the cause of 
irrational decision under disaster conditions was limited. Consequently, accumulated 
lessons learned by recovery experiences have not been linked to the efficient 
achievement of recovery goals, and similar mistakes in long-term recovery have been 
repeated. Although there were recent researches on recovery players’ motives and 
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interactive decision-making respectively, the analysis framework unifying both 
characteristics in decisions of long-term recovery was not suggested.  
This research, therefore, aims to identify the cause of divergence of recovery process 
from the desirable direction in terms of unreasonable decisions. For that purpose, the 
analysis on decisions in long-term recovery that focuses on multifaceted motives varying 
with the context and interactive decision-making between associated players is applied. 
It is shown the limitation of existing normative approach focusing on single decision-
maker’s will. It also discusses the decisive conditions for change key decisions, which 
seriously hindered achievement recovery goals, as well. In this research, it is ultimately 
aimed to contribute to the improvement of long-term recovery process.  
As a case of long-term recovery, the permanent housing reconstruction by INGOs in 
Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is analyzed. With abundant financial 
support and participation of INGOs as implementers, Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) 
had planned to relocate 30,602 houses, one third of total 98,525 houses for 
reconstruction, by INGOs-driven reconstruction. However, as a result of long process, 
only 16,578 houses are completed by INGOs-driven program. Besides, it resulted slow 
progress and low occupation rate of new houses, which reached to 37% in Hambantota. 
Although many researches on Sri Lanka case had found several factors that caused 
limited outcomes, these factors were enumerated without unifying framework of actual 
decision. Moreover, some suggested solutions, such as consideration of future 
vulnerability, were already included the ‘Guiding Principles’, which were shared to all 
involved players before the start of reconstruction. This case clearly showed the gap 
between lessons learned in normative approach and actual decision-making in the field, 
and the necessity of the analysis framework on decisions in terms of interactive decision-
making among players with multifaceted motives.  
This research analyzes the decisions in long-term recovery focusing on multifaceted 
motives varying with the context and interactive decision-making between associated 
players in Sri Lanka. Analysis procedure consists of four steps: (1) identification of key 
decision and associated players, (2) motive analysis based on the context of decision, (3) 
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interactive decision analysis, and (4) identification of key condition to improve decision. 
As the analysis method for interactive decision-making between recovery players, the 
game theoretic approaches are applied. Two different methods are suggested according 
to the focal points: (a) Classic game theory-based analysis is applied to sequential 
decisions in terms of process aspect in long-term recovery, and (b) Hypergame-based 
analysis is applied to the decision at the early stage of cooperation in regard to 
uncertainty and misunderstanding during the disaster situation.   
 In Sri Lanka case, two key decisions were identified. One is GoSL's failure of 
relocation policy using uniform distance line from the coastline at initial planning. 
Another is INGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal during reconstruction 
implementation. As key players, GoSL and INGOs are considered. Based on the 
literature review, each player’s payoff table regarding possible decisions is evaluated. 
In terms of decision of coastal buffer zone, no reconstruction zone for the safety 
from tsunami, hasty introduction of uniform distance relocation policy by GoSL was the 
result of complex conditions and motives including GoSL’s political conflict, lack of 
relocation experience, and INGO’s competition for recovery participation. For GoSL's 
failure of relocation policy, it was shown that if the INGOs had declared their 
appropriate strategy, which served as the thread, GoSL’s right choice could be the 
relocation policy using subdivided criteria. However, it did not happen because of 
competition among INGOs. Therefore, permanent coordination system among INGOs in 
housing field can be a practical solution. 
INGOs’ projects withdrawal was made based on motives and conditions including 
accumulated limitation of uniform relocation plan, political regime change, and 
emergence of new vulnerable people. For INGO’s withdrawal, the situation was 
analyzed by the game theoretic framework and it was shown that even though INGOs 
and GoSL might have recognized that there was an Pareto optimal solution, they had to 
take another solution, Nash-equilibrium of the game, without mutual trust. It indicates 
that GoSL could have prevented INGOs’ withdrawal during the recovery, as a motive-
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compatible solution, by shared responsibility for housing reconstruction, which will 
increase INGO’s expected payoff in long-term participation. 
Because of various uncertainties immediately after the disaster, the influence of 
uncertainties on irrational decision-making of each player should be considered. 
Hypergame analysis is applied to GoSL’s hasty decision of uniform distance relocation. 
Strategies of players will be defined according to each player’s subjective perspective. 
Subjective perspective on counterpart’s preference order is identified according to shared 
information between players and the characteristics of each recovery player. Individual 
games based on interpretation of others are analyzed in the context of each player. 
Finally, the influence of misunderstanding on recovery process and practical solution are 
discussed. 
As the result of hypergame analysis, the outcome of interactive decision itself is the 
same with previous analysis. At the same time, misunderstanding, which represented as 
differently perceived counterpart’s preference order, became one of causes that 
prevented desirable decision in terms of long-term recovery objectives. As a practical 
solution to reduce misunderstanding, the complemented list of information for NGO 
registration system is suggested. 
       
5.1.2 Suggestion  
Results of case analysis on housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka highly depend on 
unique characteristics of Sri Lanka context. When it is considered that the exactly same 
disaster cannot occur again, implication of analysis result to general disaster cases should 
be considered.  
First of all, the characteristics of disaster recovery aids can be considered. Although 
the number of player who needs aids is one, the government, the players who try to 
provide aids are quite many agencies. Therefore, it is inevitable that regional and sectoral 
gaps in aids occur during the recovery process (IASC, 2010; GFDRR, 2011).  Such gap 
can be found at the survey result on Aceh and Nias, Indonesia case after the 2004 
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Tsunami as Figure 5.1. While some sectors such as health and education are overfunded, 
mainly long-term recovery sectors including transport, housing, flood control, etc. failed 
to secure the necessary fund (GFDRR, 2010). According to another survey by GFDRR 
(2011), recovery participants considered lack of effective and efficient coordination as 
the biggest constraint to successful response.  Therefore, how to cope with such sectoral 
gap can be key issue for successful recovery.  
 
 
Figure 5.1   Sectoral Gaps in aid for Aceh, Indonesia after the 2004 Tsunami  (GFDRR, 2010) 
 
Sri Lanka case reflected problems by sectoral gaps. To cope with huge demand for 
housing reconstruction, extra fund in short-term relief work naturally flowed in housing 
field with INGOs. When previous analysis on Sri Lanka case is considered, the 
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characteristics of INGOs in housing field as a player showed the exactly same 
characteristics of INGOs working at the short-term relief. It is because the majority of 
INGOs in housing reconstruction of Sri Lanka was INGOs that work mainly at the 
humanitarian relief fields.     
External agencies for disaster recovery can be divided into two groups according to 
main motive and characteristics in interrelation with the government. Those are agencies 
focusing on short-term support and agencies focusing on long-term cooperation. Firstly, 
short-term support-focused agencies include INGOs, which highly depends on the 
private donors. Regarding motives, consideration of donors’ expectation and prompt 
outcomes play important role in decision-making. Because these agencies support within 
the government’s frame for recovery, these agencies will not active in negotiate with the 
government to change the policy. Secondly, long-term cooperation-focused agencies 
include UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors. In terms of motives, these 
agencies take account of long-term impact than donors because of relatively stable influx 
of budget. Because cooperation can extend into long-term development project, these 
agencies try active negotiation with the government on the policy. Each type of agencies 
has advantages and disadvantages, and these characteristics are developed in accordance 
with each main work field. However, when such features are mixed with different work 
field, sustainability of recovery process can be hampered. 
Sri Lanka’s problems in the housing reconstruction process can be said as the 
representative problem when agencies focusing on short-term support extended their 
commitment to long-term recovery for bridging the sectoral gaps of aids. Both 
competition for donors and participation in inappropriate relocation plan without threat 
for improvement were the results from the common characteristics of short-term 
supporting agencies. Withdrawal of project also can be understood by the characteristics 
of short-term supporting agencies that had to meet the donor’s variable needs. Before 
finding the general solution, the present state of coordination system for housing field 
and some more cases should be considered.     
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Unlike emergency response fields, the coordination among the agencies was not 
emphasized in housing field. For instance, when the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) established 9 clusters in 2005, only emergency shelter was established. Even in 
the emergency shelter cluster, the role of Global Cluster Lead, IFRC, was relatively 
weak and doesn’t act as the ‘provider of last resort’, as do other Cluster Leads (Jha et al., 
2010). Therefore, its coordination capacity even in the permanent housing field was very 
limited. In spite of several global coordination mechanisms such as IASC in 1992 and 
the Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning in 2008, these 
mechanisms didn’t include INGOs. Even though the Global Humanitarian Platform 
(GHP) was created in 2006 including NGOs, UN agencies and International 
organizations, normative “Principles of Partnership” was shared without concrete 
mechanisms for coordination.  
When it comes to actual recovery cases, there was partially successful case of 
coordination of long-term reconstruction in Indonesia after the 2004 Tsunami (GFDRR, 
2010). The Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) was established in April 2005 in 
response to the government’s request to coordinate donor support for reconstruction 
(GFDRR, 2011). The MDF pooled 655 million USD from 15 donors and provided to 
projects implemented by the government, international organizations, NGOs and 
communities. However, participants were mainly foreign governments and only 10% of 
budget for reconstruction was coordinated by MDF (MDF, 2012). However, even in the 
same place, Aceh and Nias, there were the same problems with Sri Lanka case by INGOs’ 
implementation. Many of INGOs had expended their commitment from emergencies 
relief to housing reconstruction to meet an unprecedented grant flow (Steinberg, 2007). 
Uncoordinated participation of INGOs, however, resulted in low quality houses, 
abandoned unfinished houses.  
To solve this coordination issue, existing researches and reports have emphasized the 
government’s strong will and its leadership. For instance, the IASC report on Haiti 
reconstruction at the early recovery phase, it is strongly recommended that the 
government of Haiti’s adopt the same approach with Indonesian government for MDF as 
a successful case (IASC, 2010). World Bank report on reconstruction emphasizes that 
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government should coordinate the work of NGOs and monitor their performance as a 
leading agency (Jha et al., 2010) On the other hand, INGOs’ role is recommended as 
partners under the government’s leadership (GFDRR, 2011).     
When the implementation of coordination among INGOs in long-term recovery 
depends heavily on only government’s leadership, it is easy to repeat the failure because 
of relatively limited capability of developing countries after large-scale disaster. In the 
case that the government lost their capability by disaster such as Aceh, Indonesia, 
government-driven approach cannot be implemented. Therefore, in the same manner as 
previous Sri Lanka case analysis, practical solution can be considered for the problems 
when agencies focusing on short-term support extend their commitment to long-term 
recovery based on the different motive of players and their interactive relationship.  
First of all, in the viewpoint of not government but external agencies, it can be 
another solution that establishment of the coordination system covering short-term 
support-focused INGOs for housing field and designation of lead agency, which can act 
as the ‘provider of last resort’ in key decision. Through this coordination system, 
available aids can be aligned with needs in fields in global viewpoint instead of each 
INGO perspective. This system will be effective to reduce the time for policy-making by 
unifying the related stakeholders as well. Even though the government lost the capability 
to lead the coordination, this coordination system can prevent competitive participation 
or withdrawal of project by internal binding power.   
Secondly, based on the coordination system, shared responsibility in housing 
reconstruction based on each player’s motive and payoff can be introduced. In the actual 
success cases of recovery from Gujarat earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, unlike Sri 
Lanka case, INGOs took part in only consistent part with their motives by the partnership 
with local people, the government and private sectors (ADB & WB, 2008; Jha et al., 
2010). If such aspect is considered, exceed fund of INGOs can be applied to housing 
field successfully. As the departmentalized participation of INGOs that focus on short-
term support role, it can be considered as possible option that cooperation with housing 
field specialized agencies such as UN-Habitat and responsibility sharing with local 
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government. For instance, in the responsibility sharing with the government for funding, 
INGOs can achieve much more outcomes with the same amount of fund comparing to 
single responsibility case. It becomes the motive-compatible solution for INGOs trying 
to match the donor’s expectation. On the other hand, the government can expect stable 
long-term commitment of INGO by increased expected payoff on projects.  
 
5.1.3 Conclusion  
The analysis using classic game theory shows the difficulty of sustainable long-term 
disaster recovery process.  Even when players had the long-term goal, or they shared the 
long-term goal, due to the decisions made in the interactive decisions-making process, 
such long-term goals may not be implemented. Even though players made ‘rational’ 
choice depending on their own motives and contexts, the decision as result of interactive 
decision-making can hamper the achievement of recovery objective.  
For achieving long-term recovery goals, it was important that recovery policy and 
institutions are corresponding to each player’s motive at specific time. Motive 
compatible policy and institutions can achieve the long-term recovery goals as subgame 
perfect equilibrium by making the condition for all players to match their own motives at 
each phase. Suggested practical solutions are reviewed in terms of motive-compatibility 
and applicability to actual complex conditions of Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami.  
The analysis also indicates the importance of the initial stage of the process since the 
failure in the initial phase had a lasting effect on players’ motives as path dependency. 
For instance, government’s exclusion of INGOs in initial planning demotivated INGOs’ 
continuous participation in long-term recovery, leading to the decline in outcomes of 
housing reconstruction.  
The problems discussed in this research have a game theoretic structure. It indicates 
the importance of coordination and information sharing among associated organizations 
would be helpful to overcome those problems.  It is not an easy task, but would deserve 
the efforts.   
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In this research, it indicates that adjustment of recovery policy and institutions 
considering players’ motive is important to achieve the long-term recovery goals. To 
develop such findings to concrete recovery policy, accumulation of research results on 
other cases in different context is needed as further research.  
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5.2 Future Work 
 
5.2.1 Research Limitations  
Regarding limitation of this research, as the first step to analyze long-term recovery 
process in terms of motive, player’s characteristics and motives are simplified as one 
player to consider entire recovery process. For instance, various INGOs can have 
different motive according to purpose of establishment. However, such differences are 
not fully considered in the definition of player’s motive focusing on majority’s 
characteristics. Only limited players are considered in the analysis of interactive process. 
However, the affected people or the private sectors should be considered to understand 
realistic process in detail. Finally, though long-term recovery includes many sequential 
decisions, only two key decisions are considered.  
Lack of data on disaster recovery is commonly mentioned as limitation in disaster 
research because of difficulties to make documents under emergency situation. To define 
the motive of organizations, detailed information on their decision-making process from 
the internal viewpoint is needed, but it is quite rare. In this research, internal viewpoint 
on their possible option strongly depends on a few organizations such as IFRC, Belgian 
Red Cross, UN-Habitat, etc. Fortunately, these organizations’ role in housing 
reconstruction was large in Sri Lanka case. So, overall trend could be identified. In terms 
of methodology for motive analysis, common methodology such as experimental-based 
approach is difficult to apply to long-term disaster condition because control of other 
factors is almost impossible in the disaster recovery. Another methodology such as 
survey-based approach has also difficulty to conduct because memory of practitioner 
becomes vague when the long-term process is finished. Therefore, for more detailed 
analysis, there is need to trace one long-term recovery from beginning to the end of 
reconstruction.    
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5.2.2 Future Work  
As the further research, first of all, regarding derived key factors in recovery process, 
discussion should be improved by receiving feedback and comments from practitioners 
actually working in the housing recovery process in Sri Lanka. In this research, inference 
based on literatures from various viewpoints was used to define motives in decisions 
because each player’s report and interview can have biases or self-justification. However, 
interview with practitioners will be needed to verify the revealed factors based on 
literature review. Further improvement to analysis can be expected from feedback on 
additional constraints in the process that didn’t appear at written literature.  
Secondly, in terms of an extended application of analysis outcomes, a further 
analysis dealing with other long-term recovery cases should be conducted. Although the 
causes for divergence of recovery process are found at Sri Lanka case, it could be 
exceptional causes depending on the particular situation of Sri Lanka. This research 
shows that lack of mutual trust resulted in unreasonable decision because of increasing 
uncertainty. However, it can be still early to conclude that trust between players can 
reduce uncertainty in decision-making. For that reason, verification of these factors can 
be done by several other recovery cases including successful cases.  
Thirdly, subjective perception’s influence should be verified in detail as further study. 
Sensitivity analysis about the difference of subjective recognition of payoff table can be 
conducted. It is important to identify the factors that directly influence on decision-
making out of various influential factors. Sensitivity analysis on the difference of 
subjective recognition of payoff table will be helpful for that. To verify influence by 
subjective perception on decision-making in recovery process, interview or survey with 
practitioners will be needed. 
Finally, various INGOs can have different motives and its priority according to 
purpose of establishment, such as charity based INGOs etc. At the same time, interactive 
relations can be differently defined according to types of relation, and relation between 
Gov. and INGOs is just one of them. Based on these aspects, long-term recovery phases 
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can be understood as shift of phase of organization relationship.  With this framework of 
phase shift, the sustainability of long-term recovery process can be evaluated.  
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